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RECENT DECISIONS
ADanRALTY-JURISDICTIoN-APPLICATION OF STATE AVOREXIEN'S Compm IENsAron AcT
TO MAMrrIlaE INJURY UNDER NON- AIn=m EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.-The de-
fendant was engaged in constructing a building on Riker's Island, in the East River.
Having assumed the obligation of transporting its worlunen, it arranged with the
owner of a steamboat for such transportation, guaranteeing a minimum daily income.
The claimant, an employee of the defendant, was injured when the vessel exploded
while carrying the defendant's employees to work. Held, three judges dissenting,
that since the injury to the claimant was received in the performance of a non-
maritime contract of employment and was a matter of local concern merely, it was
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty, and the state compensation law
was applicable. Heaney v. P. J. Carlin Cost. Co., 269 N. Y. 93, 199 N. E. 16 (1935).
The general principles separating the respective spheres of state and federal juris-
diction in the field of maritime matters are well established. In contract, admiralty
jurisdiction depends primarily upon the nature of the transaction, and in tort, upon
the locus delicti.1 It is generally conceded that liability in workmen's compensation
laws is not tortious. Some authorities regard this liability imposed by statute as
impliedy incorporated into the contract of employment,2 while others consider such
liability to be an incident of the status of master and servant 3 Since under either
view the liability sounds in contract the determination of the appropriate law is
dependent upon the nature of the contract.
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jcnsen,4 the
state courts had held that concurrent with the federal jurisdiction, state compensation
acts applied to injuries sustained on navigable waters, even if the contract of employ-
ment were maritime in nature.5 The Jensen case, however, decided that in view of
the fact that workmen's compensation was wholly unknown to the common law, it
was not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases
of maritime and admiralty jurisdiction to the courts of the United States.0 The
Supreme Court in its abrogation of the rule previously adhered to by the state courts
used broad language and failed to distinguish many phases of the question. The
1. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U. S. *441 (1847); 1 BrNMxcr, ADMRLTY (Sth ed. 1925) 1.
2. State Industrial Comm. v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922); Post v. Burger,
216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916); Toey v. Howland, 224 N. Y. 30, 120 N. E. 53 (1918);
Matter of Cameron v. Ellis Const. Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622 (1930).
3. Cudahy Co. v. Parramour, 263 U. S. 418 (1923).
4. 244 U. S. 205 (1917).
5. North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 174 Cal. 346, 163 Pac. 199 (1917);
Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Ad. 372 (1915) ; Lindstrom v. Mutual
S. S. Co., 132 Minn. 328, 156 N. W. 669 (1916); Matter of Walker, 215 N. Y. 529, 109
N. E. 604 (1915), rev'd on other grounds, 244 U. S. 255 (1917).
6. As a result of this decision, the judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STA. 76, granting to United
States District Courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime juriiction .. . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy
where the common law was competent to give it," was amended by the Act of 1917,
40 STAT. 395, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1926), which added "and to claimants the rights and
remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state." But the Supreme Court
held this amendment unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149
(1920), on the ground that it was an attempted delegation of the legislative power of
Congress to the states and was disruptive of the harmony and uniformity of the maritimo
law. Four justices dissented.
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seeming scope of the language has been cut down, however, by subsequent decisions.
.Thus, although the injury occurs upon navigable waters, state acts have been held
applicable where (1) the contract, even though maritime, was of merely local con-
cern; (2) its performance had no direct effect upon interstate commerce or navi-
gation; (3) the application of the state act would not materially prejudice the
uniformity or any characteristic feature of admiralty law; 7 (4) the contract was
not maritime in nature.8 Under these qualifications a lumber inspector was allowed
state compensation for injuries received upon a vessel in navigable waters while
checking lumber destined for his employer's mill.0 Similarly a motion picture actor
received compensation for injuries sustained during the making of a film upon a ship
in navigable waters.10
The case of Spencer Kellogg Co. v. Hicks, Adm'x.,11 relied on by the dissent in the
instant case, is at first glance in square conflict with the holding of the majority
court. In that case the employer owned a launch used to ferry its employees across
the Hudson River to its factory. The employer brought a proceeding to limit its
liability for injuries resulting from the sinking of the launch. The Court, in denying
limitation of liability, held the state compensation act inapplicable on the ground
that a maritime tort had been committed. Both the Kellogg and the Jensen cases
pointed out that the remedy of workmen's compensation is wholly inconsistent with
the policy of Congress to encourage and foster the merchant marine, as manifested
in the statutory provision for limited liability of ship-owners. 12 The conflict between
the limitation statutes and State Workmen's Compensation Acts, however, arises only
where the ship-owner is also the employer, and not as in the instant case where the
employer is not the owner. Accordingly, the position of the majority court seems
well taken. It is difficult to comprehend in what manner the application of the
New York Workmen's Compensation Act to a New York employer and a New York
employee under a non-maritime contract will mar the uniformity of admiralty law or
interfere with the policy of Congress. The ship-owner is neither concerned in
nor affected by the proceeding. The right of the claimant sprang from a non-maritime
contract of employment, purely local in nature, and not from the fact of his being
a passenger on the vessel.
7. State Industrial Comm. v. Nordenholt, 259 U. S. 263 (1922); Alaska Packers Ass'n
v. Industrial Canning Co., 276 U. S. 467 (1928) ; see La Casse v. Great Lakes Engineering
Works, 242 Mich. 454, 462, 219 N. W. 730, 733 (1928); cf. Reinhardt v. Newport Flying
Service Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371 (1921) (injury by hydro-aeroplane on water
held exclusively within admiralty jurisdiction).
8. Grant-Smith Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922); Funtes v. Gulf Coast
Dredging Co., 54 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) (furniture dealer's employee fell from
barge while delivering furniture to barge captain); Wildfeuer v. Miller & Gold, 196 App.
Div. 667, 188 N. Y. Supp. 81 (3d Dep't 1921); cf. Federal Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424, 33 U. S. C. A. §§ 901-950 (1927), expressly
applying to maritime employments, justifying an inference that Congress desires the state
acts to regulate the non-maritime field.
9. Rosengrant v. Harvard, 273 U. S. 664 (1926), aff'g without opinion, Ex parle Rosen-
grant, 213 Ala. 202, 104 So. 409 (1925).
10. Madderns v. Fox Film Corp., 205 App. Div. 791, 200 N. Y. Supp. 344 (3d Dep't
1923), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 614, 143 N. E. 764 (1924).
11. 285 U. S. 502 (1932).
12. 9 STAT. 635 (1851), 23 STAT. 57 (1884), 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U. S. C. A.
§§ 181-190 (1926).
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISCHARGE or ATTORNEY-A-MEnUs or CoPrnsz noN.-
An attorney entered into a written contract with an executrix, by which he agreed
to perform the legal services necessary to liquidate her husband's estate for the
sum of $5,000. When the contract was substantially performed, the executrix, with-
out cause, discharged the attorney. He claimed the reasonable value of his services.
The Surrogate found the reasonable value of the services to be the contract price,
less the proportionate value of the agreed work remaining to be done, that is, about
$4,167. On appeal, held, that when a client discharges his attorney before his services
are completed, the agreed price is no longer the controlling factor. Therefore the
reasonable value of the services, computed independently of the contract is the
measure, and on this basis the attorney was entitled to $13,000. Matter of Mont-
gomnery, 284 N. Y. Supp. 5 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1935).
An attorney-client contract is a distinctive one, springing from a personal and
confidential relationship, and possessing unique features. 1  Despite the quasi-
fiduciary nature of the contract, the weight of authority maintains that a discharge
of the attorney by the client, without just cause, will constitute a breach of the
contract.2  The minority and New York view, on the other hand, considers that
the peculiar nature of this relationship demands the implication of a condition
empowering the client arbitrarily to dismiss his attorney without thereby committing
a breach of the contract.5 The terminology employed to denote the effect upon
the contract of the exercise of this implied right typifies the efforts of the courts
to avoid the taint of breach. Accordingly, the contract is said to be "cancelled,"
"abrogated," "rescinded" or "discharged." 4  In recognition of the basic lack of
mutuality inherent in the minority rule, the courts temper its harshness by limiting
its application. Consequently, it has been held that the retaining of an attorney
on an annual basis contemplates no specific litigation, results solely in the ordinary
business rather than a personal relationship, and thus justifies the application of
the ordinary rules governing breaches of contract.5
1. See Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398, 401, 98 N. E. 914, 915 (1912); Martin v.
Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 173, 114 N. E. 47, 48 (1916); Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 230
N. Y. 70, 73, 129 N. E. 211, 211 (1920).
2. Dixon v. Volunteer Co-op. Bank, 213 Iass. 345, 100 N. E. 655 (1913); Scheinesohn
v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N. E. 913 (1911).
3. Lawler v. Dunn, 145 MAinn. 281, 176 N. W. 989 (1920); Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y.
170, 114 N. E. 46 (1916); Matter of Krooks, 257 N. Y. 329, 178 N. E. 548 (1931);
Johnson v. Ravitch, 113 App. Div. 810, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (2d Dep't 1905) (client's
action to supersede attorney); Ritz v. Carpenter, 43 S. D. 236, 178 N. W. 877 (1920);
Wright v. Johanson, 132 Wash. 682, 233 Pac. 16 (1925), rehearing denied, 135 Wash. 696, 236
Pac. 807 (1925). It is well established that a client may settle or compromise his cause of
action without the consent of his attorney, even where the settlement is in direct violation
of an express stipulation against such compromise, since such stipulation is consdered to
be against public policy. Southworth v. Rosendahl, 133 Minn. 447, 158 N. W. 717, 3
A. L. R. 472 (1916); Matter of Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742, 14 L. R. A. (I.. S.)
1101 (1907); see Friedman v. Mindlin, 91 Misc. 473, 478, 155 N. Y. Supp. 295, 299 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1915).
4. See Opinion of Feely, S., instant case, 156 Misc. 583, 585, 282 N. Y. Supp. 741, 744
(Suf'. Ct. 1935).
S. Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 230 N. Y. 70, 129 N. E. 211 (1920). For other limita-
tions on the minority rule, see Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 176, 114 N. E. 46, 48 (1916) ;
(1921) 21 CoL. L. Rnv. 188; (1916) 30 HARv. L. Rnv. 183. For a discus-ion and criticLqm
of this doctrine, see 2 WmLasroz, CoNTRncrs (1920) § 1029; (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rsv. 367;
19361
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Where the attorney is arbitrarily and without just cause discharged, the problem
of determining the amount and measure of compensation is presented. In some of
the jurisdictions where such discharge would constitute a breach, a recovery based
on the actual damages sustained by the attorney as a result of the breach is allowed. 0
In others, it is held that the attorney is entitled to recover the full contract price,
as stipulated in the agreement, whether the retainer be fixed, 7 or contingent8 regard-
less of the degree of performance. This holding is based on the manifest difficulty
of making an apportionment of services and compensation, and on the theory that
an innocent party is entitled to the full value of his contract, where he is wrongfully
prevented from completing performance. 9 New York, and some other jurisdictions,
maintain that despite the extent of performance, quantum mteruit measures the
amount to be received, since the retainer contract is abrogated, not merely breached,
by the discharge, and is no longer effective as the sole standard for measuring the
value of the services rendered.' 0 However, its terms are relevant in determining
the amount of recovery. Nevertheless, it appears to be the general policy in most
jurisdictions, whether the recovery be on the contract or in quantum mterult, to limit
Comment (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 514-520. Under the majority or minority rule an attorney
may, for justifiable cause, refuse to continue in the service of his client, and still be
entitled to his fee. Mutter v. Burgess, 87 Colo. 580, 290 Pac. 269 (1930) ; Tenney v. Berger,
93 N. Y. 524 (1883) (hiring associate attorney without consent of incumbent attorney);
Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398, 98 N. E. 914 (1912) (unfriendly relations with client's
receiver).
6. Dixon v. Volunteer Co-Op. Bank, 213 Mass. 345, 100 N. E. 655 (1913); Simon v.
Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 45 N. D. 251, 177 N. W. 107 (1920) (actual damages or
quantum mervit) ; see French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 639, 49 N. E. 797, 799 (1898).
7. Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621, 18 Pac. 796 (1888); Dorshimer v. Herndon, 98 Neb.
421, 153 N. W. 496 (1915); see City of Detroit v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 281, 285 (1873).
8. Bartlett v. Odd-Fellows' Say. Bank, 79 Cal. 218, 21 Pac. 743 (1889); Kersey v.
Garton, 77 Mo. 645 (1883); Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N. E. 913
(1911) (since the parties have anticipated the worth of the services, this figure Is the
fairest value for recovery); cf. White v. American Law Book Co., 106 Okla. 166, 233
Pac. 426 (1924) (recovery allowed even where contract remains executory, if contingency
has occurred). Contra: Tillman v. Komar, 259 N. Y. 133, 181 N. E. 75 (1932) (the value
of one attorney's services is not to be measured by the result obtained by another).
9. See Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621, 623, 18 Pac. 796, 797 (1888); City of Detroit
v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 281, 285 (1873); White v. American Law Book Co., 106 Okla.
166, 167, 233 Pac. 426, 427 (1924).
10. French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 797 (1898); Matter of Snyder,
190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742, 14 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1101 (1907) (settlement by client, contrary
to contract); Andrewes v. Haas, 214 N. Y. 255, 108 N. E. 423, 3 A. L. R. 458 (1915)
(abandonment of action by client); Tillman v. Komar, 259 N. Y. 133, 181 N. E. 75
(1932); Ramey v. Graves, 112 Wash. 88, 191 Pac. 801 (1920). Discharge by death of
an attorney permits only a quantum meruit recovery. Baxter v. Billings, 83 Fed. 790
(C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Sargent v. McLoed, 209 N. Y. 360, 103 N. E. 164, 52 L. R. A. (n. s,)
380 (1913). The elements to be regarded in a quantum meruit assessment are many,
various, and indefinite. Randall v. Packard, 142 N. Y. 47, 36 N. E. 823 (1894) (result
is one of the main constituents); see People ex rel. Johnson v. Board of Supervisors,
45 N. Y. 196, 202 (1871) (labor, time, and skill of the attorney must all be regarded);
Starin v. Mayor, 106 N. Y. 82, 88, 12 N. E. 643, 647 (1887) (taxable costs did not set
the standard).
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the maximum compensation to the contract price, since the contract in this respect is
regarded as still governing even after the discharge.1 '
In the instant case, it is apparent that the court in applying quantum Mcrmit without
limiting the recovery to the contract price, is penalizing the client for exercising a
supposed right. The application to an attorney-client case of the rule allowing
recovery in quantum meruit in excess of the contract price where the defendant has
been guilty of a breach,' 2 in effect nullifies the existence of the client's right to
terminate the contract. It would seem more just to limit the recovery to a pro-
portionate amount of the entire stipulated price, as expressed in the contract.
BANKRUPTCY-CORPORATn REORGANIZATION-CoNSTrrUTIONALITY OF SECTION 77B
(b) (5) As rT AxFECrS SECURED Cnnrrons.-X was the receiver of a closed bank
which held bonds of the debtor, part of an issue secured by a deed of trust providing
that upon default of payment of interest or principal the security might be foreclosed
and sold at public auction either through proceedings in equity or by advertisement.
X brought proceedings in equity and the affairs of the debtor were placed in the
hands of a receiver. Claims were filed and a date for a final hearing set. On the
previous day A acquired all the debtor's common stock, had himself elected president
and instituted proceedings under Section 77B. Two proposed plans were rejected
by most of the creditors and the debtor presented a third plan which recognized
the futility of securing the consent of two thirds of the creditors in each class,
proceeding under the alternative method of sub-section b (5). The District Court
held sub-section b (5) unconstitutional and dismissed the debtor's petition and plan
for corporate reorganization. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting as to the finding
of bad faith, that the plan did not meet the requirement of good faith, and that
sub-section b (5) violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In re
Tennessee Pub. Co., 81 F. (2d) 463 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
Section 77B,1 the objective of which is to effect a more adequate, and less
expensive and cumbersome method of corporate reorganization, to be used in lieu
of the equity receivership procedure with its attendant evils,2 is undoubtedly an act
on the subject of bankruptcy.3 This federal power to pass bankruptcy legislation
11. Weil v. Fineran, 78 Ark. 87, 93 S. W. 568 (1906); Owneby v. Silverstein, 69 Colo.
325, 194 Pac. 607 (1920) ; Goodwin v. Hayes, 88 Ky. 112, 8S S. W. 1101 (1905) ; ci. Sargent
v. McLoed, 209 N. Y. 360, 103 N. E. 164 (1913) (discharge by death of attorney). Contra:
Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P. (2d) 258 (Cal. App. 1935); Smith v. Thompson, 248 S. W. 1070
(Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
12. Where the defendant is innocent and the plaintiff who has breached his contract to
such an extent that he must abandon it sues in quasi contract for benefits conferred, his
recovery is limited to the contract price. The agreed price may be exceeded, however,
where the defendant has breached the contract. 3 WIzsro., Co. Mcrs (1920) § 1485.
Compare Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 411 (1850), wherein the defendant was not permitted to
introduce evidence that the reasonable value of the services rendered was less than the
contract price, where an act of the legislature made completion of performance by the
plaintiff impossible, since the plaintiff, who was suing in quasi contract, was not in default.
1. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), as amended by 49 Str'. 664, 965, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1935).
2. See Morris, Equity Receiverships and Bankruptcy (1935) 9 J. NAT. Ass'r RErzms
B A,-RxuPrcY 68 (address); Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Equity vs. Bankruptcy
(1933) 17 Aft=. L. Rv. 237; Corporate Reorganization-An Amendment to the Bankruptcy
Act-A Symposium. (1933) 19 VA. L. REV. 317-350.
3. See note 5, infra.
1936]
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is, however, circumscribed by the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment.4
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet passed upon it, the
constitutionality of the general scope of the Act may no doubt be inferred from that
Court's decision in reference to the railroad reorganization statute,8 However, as
to the particular sections of the Act, constitutional difficulties may be encountered.
Section 77B (b) (5)6 provides methods for the adjustment of liens and claims
of dissenting creditors, of a class wherein a two-thirds consent to a plan cannot be
obtained, so as to render their approval unnecessary to a confirmation of the plan.
In considering the constitutionality of this subdivision the holding of the Rock Island
case is of no aid, since the parallel provision in Section 777 was not considered in
that decision. It is true that 77B is similar to a composition insofar ds it provides
that upon two-thirds of a class consenting, that consent is binding upon the minority,
and so perhaps the section may not be attacked as depriving that minority of
property without due process.8  Non constat the situation contemplated by sub.
section b (5) is to be so compared and substantiated. On the contrary, the very fact
that a majority consent cannot be obtained is the reason for invoking this provision.
It is here, by imposing adjustments, that 77B encroaches upon the property rights
of secured creditors in a manner never before successfully attempted by a bankruptcy
statute.
4. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935). Prior to this
decision a well reasoned argument had been advanced that the bankruptcy power was not
subject to the Fifth Amendment. See Gerdes, Constitutionality of Section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rnv. 196, 207-211. But cf. Hanover Nat. Bank
v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 (1902).
5. In Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
294 U. S. 648 (1935), the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 47 STAT. 1474, 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1933), subsequently amended by 49 STAT. 911
(1935).
6. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (b) (5) (1934). The methods provided are:
(1) by the transfer or sale of the property subject to the claims, interests or liens, or
retention by the debtor subject to such interests, claims or liens; (2) by a sale free of
such interests, claims or liens at a fair upset price and the transfer of the interests, claims
or liens to the proceeds; (3) by appraisal and payment in cash of the value of such
interests, claims or liens, or at the creditors' election of securities allotted to such Interests,
claims or liens under the plan; (4) by such method as will in the opinion of the judge,
under the circumstances, provide protection. Apparently the instant decision was concerned
only with the third and fourth methods. The fourth method is not treated in this note.
7. Section 77 at the time of the Rock Island decision contained a provision which
allowed substantially the same adjustments as 77B (b) (5). See 47 STAT. 1474, 11 U. S.
C. A. § 205 (e), (g) (6). But Section 77 as amended by 49 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 205 (1935), will also allow these adjustments although the Act as rewritten does not
list the methods as it did formerly. See subsections e and b, of the new Act.
8. But it should be noted that in a composition under Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act,
30 STAT. 549 (1898), as amended to 44 STAT. 663, 11 U. S. C. A. § 30 (1926), only the
minority of unsecured creditors were bound by the will of the majority. See It re
Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929, 933 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); GLEN, LiQUIDATION (1935) § 378.
Those who favor the extension of the "majority binding the minority" doctrine to secured
creditors bridge this gap in the analogy by maintaining that there should be no distinction
in principle between the rights of secured and unsecured creditors. See In re Burgh, 7
F. Supp. 184, 185 (D. Ill. 1933), where the court said, "A secured debt or lien Is, so far
as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, a no more sacred kind of property
[Vol. 5
RECENT DECISIONS
The impairment of remedy is not a violation of due process unless it accomplishes
a deprivation of substantive right 9 True, in some instances the line between impair-
ment of remedy and infringement of property is difficult of determination, 0 but the
boundaries of this indeterminate zone are dearly defined. Thus, the Supreme Court
in holding unconstitutional the first Frazier-Lemke Act,"t pointed out that the rights
of a mortgagee to retain his lien until the indebtedness was paid, to realize upon
the security by a judicial public sale, to determine, subject to the discretion of
the court, when such sale should be held, to enjoy, during the period of default,
the control of the property and have the rents and profits applied toward satisfaction
of the debt, are all dearly substantive rights and cannot be denied without violating
due process.' 2 Section 77B (b) (5) (c) which provides protection to the dissenting
creditor "by appraisal and payment either in cash of the value either of such interest,
claims, or liens, or, at the objecting creditors' election, of the securities allotted to
such interest, claims, or liens under the plan, if any shall be so allotted..." denies
precisely these rights.
The argument that the appraisal value is equivalent to at least a fair upset price
which would have been received had there been a judicial sale, and so affords adequate
protection, ignores the results obtained by the upset price method in equity receiver-
ship procedure; namely, that the dissenting creditor, being considered an obstructionist
who favors immediate liquidation, may receive less than even the value of the
securities he would have been allotted had he consented to the reorganization.'
Assuming that the appraisal value will be a true reflection of the present value of
than an unsecured debt." This language was quoted with approval in Campbell v. Alle-
gheny Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), where the court upheld the constitution-
ality of 77B as it affected the rights of minority secured creditors. See also Gerdes, supra
note 2, at 207, where it is suggested that Congress has the power so to affect secured
creditors and has not heretofore done so merely as a matter of policy. It is submitted, on
the other hand, that the saving clauses of the new composition sections might be deemed an
admission of lack of power to impair the liens of secured creditors rather than a mere
continuance of policy. See 47 STAT. 1467, 11 U. S. C. A. § 202(i) (1933); 47 STnvr. 1470
(1933), as amended by 49 STAT. 942, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203(k) (1935).
9. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U. S. 139 (1913); Continental Ill. Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648 (1935). Since the language of
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the same it should be
given the same interpretation. See Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389, 391 (1901); Hibben
v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 325 (1903). For a collection of cases involving the question of the
impairment of the right by means of the impairment of the remedy, see cases involving
the Fourteenth Amendment cited by the Supreme Court in Home Bldg. & Loan Asa'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 434 n13 (1934).
10. For example, in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 29D U. S. 398 (1934) the
Court, faced with this problem, divided five to four.
11. 48 STAT. 1289 (1934), replaced by 49 STAT. 942, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1935).
12. Louisville joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
13. As to the working of the upset price method see Sxaine, Corporate Reorganization
under the Federal Bankruptcy Power (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 317, 331; Frank, Some Realistic
Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganiation (1933) 19 VA. L. Rm'. 541, 563,
698, 707-712. Mr. Frank also calls attention to the fact that the dissenting creditor does
not deserve, in many instances, to be treated as an obstructionist who favors liquidation
inasmuch as he may be a bona fide objector with good cause to the specific plan which is
given the color of fairness by the fact that a great percentage of creditors consented to it.
Id. at 698, 717.
1936]
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the security, the use of this method would nevertheless deprive the creditor of his
right to bid in the property and perhaps realize the full value of his lien at a future date.
Due to the instant court's holding that the plan was submitted in bad faith, 14
its decision as to constitutionality may be dictum.15 Nevertheless, its importance
should not be underestimated. To hold sub-section b (5) constitutional would be
to eliminate an important distinction between secured and unsecured creditors' rights,
and to a large extent impede corporate financing.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PRoTEcTIoN-PR=IV EGES AND IMMUNITIES-STATE
INcomE TAX E XEMPTION.-A Vermont statute' provided, inter alia,2 that income
from loans made within the state should be exempt from taxation, while income from
similar loans made without the state should be taxed. The plaintiff, a citizen of
Vermont, contested the constitutionality of the statute. It was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Vermont.8 On appeal, held, Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo dissenting,
that the discrimination between loans made within and those made without the state
denied the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, and further, that it abridged
his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States. Colgate v. Harvey,
56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935).
Repeated decisions of the Court establish the principle that the "equal protection
of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not bar state legislation that
is discriminatory merely, but forbids only discrimination that is arbitrary and un-
reasonable.4 Classification of persons or things for every purpose, including state
taxation, is permissible, provided there exists a basis of difference having a reason-
able and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.5 In the instant case a
majority of the Court regarded the discrimination in favor of loans made within
the state as a purely arbitrary one, upon the theory that it had no reasonable relation
to the legitimate purposes of state taxation. The Court conceded that a state can
14. It is interesting to note that the instant court does not define "good faith" as mere
honesty of intent, but rather inclines to the view that the plan be a workable one, and that
there be a reasonable expectancy of successful reorganization under it. For a comprehensive
treatment of "good faith," see Gerdes, "Good Faith" in the Initiation of Proceedings under
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1935) 23 Gro. L. J. 418.
15. It would appear that the court is in fact rendering an advisory opinion since Its
holding seems to be based upon a desire to prevent the submission of future plans utilizing
subsection b (5) (c) which, although meeting the requirement of good faith, would have
to be dismissed because of the subsection's invalidity if that issue were squarely raised.
1. VT. Pu. LAws (1933) §§ 872 et seq.
2. Other sections, which the Court unanimously upheld, were those pyoviding for a
higher rate of taxation on dividends of corporations doing business within the state than
on income derived from dividends of corporations engaged in business in other states,
and certain personal exemptions dependent upon the nature of the income.
3. Colgate v. Harvey, 107 Vt. 28, 175 At. 352 (1934).
4. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888); Erb v. Morascb, 177 U. S. 584
(1900); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900); Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312 (1921). Denial of the equal protection of the laws may be the result of
the practical application of the statute, as well as discriminatory provisions appearing upon
its face. Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
5. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890); Board of Education v.
Illinois, 203 U. S. 553 (1906); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60 (1919);
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 (1920).
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grant tax exemptions to foster a particular business or industry,0 and that unques-
tionably it has the right to encourage capital investments within its borders. But
the majority was of the opinion that the mere fact that loans are made vdthin
the confines of a state offers no assurance that the money will be invested there,
with resultant benefit to the state. Yet it has been the settled policy of the Court
to sustain tax classifications unless they are shown clearly to be arbitrary or un-
reasonable.7  The fact that both the Vermont Legislatures and the state's highest
court9 regarded the statute as contemplating the investment of these loans within
the state should be a strong, if not conclusive, argument that its correct interpretation
is such.1 o The presumption is in favor of its validity."
Of more interest than the question of equal protection is the decision of the
Court that, even if the state benefited by virtue of the exemption, it nevertheless
infringed the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.i s This
Amendment, adopted in 1865, created a dual citizenship, rendering United States
citizenship paramount, and the state citizenship wholly derivative therefrom.13 That
no new privileges or immunities were added by the Amendment was decided by the
Slaughter House Cases.'4 Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the
privileges and immunities of state citizenship had been defined in Corficld v. CorycIV 5
6. In American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900), the Court
sustained a state act which taxed manufacturers of sugar and molasses, but exempted
growers of cane who also manufactured those products. The obvious purpose of the
exemption was to aid agriculture. See Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232,
237 (1890).
7. Beers v. Glynn, 211 U. S. 477 (1909); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U. S. 60 (1919); Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137 (1925); cf. F. S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 (1920); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926).
8. A Vermont legislative committee recommended the exemption to prevent the flight
of capital from Vermont caused by excessive taxation. See dissenting opinion of Justice
Stone, instant case at 263, n. 1.
9. See Colgate v. Harvey, 107 Vt 28, 175 At. 352, 356 (1934).
10. See New York Central R. R. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584, 595 (1905).
11. See Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 586 (1900); Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297,
303 (1919); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 157 (1919); Frot
v. Corporation Comm., 278 U. S. 515, 522 (1929); cf. Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving
District, 274 U. S. 387, 391 (1927).
12. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States. . . ." Compare U. S. Co:.sr. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see
Comment (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 347.
13. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 389 (1918). Prior to the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, United States citizenship depended upon citizeniup in a
state. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 393 (1873). See note 11, SuPra.
14. 83 U. S. 36 (1873). The narrow question in the Slaughter House Cases was the
light of a state to establish a monopoly. The argument was made that the effect of
the privileges and immunities clause was to transfer to the federal government the pro-
tection of all privileges and immunities theretofore regarded as emanating from citiznsip
in a state. This contention was tejected, four justices dienting. See =disn-ting opinion
of Justice Field, id. at 101. For a thorough discussion of the decision, see 2 Wv=zr,
Tr. SuPREmm CouRt nr UuIran STArEs HIsroRy (1932) c. 32.
15. 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,230 at 551-552 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1823). This case involved the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the states. They were declared to be "protection
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as those fundamental privileges belonging to the citizens of all free governments.
In approving this definition, the Court in the Slaughter House Cases recognized the
distinction between the privileges and immunities stemming from citizenship in a
state and those of national citizenship.10 No comprehensive enumeration has ever
been attempted by the Court, but a method of exclusion has been employed, based
upon the underlying principle that the privileges and immunities protected against
state abridgment are those arising from the very nature of the federal government.17
Those that have thus far been recognized are fundamental:' 8 the right of expatriation; 10
the right of free ingress and egress from one state to another; 20 the right to reside
on homestead land; 21 the privilege of being exempt from racial discrimination; 22
the right to vote for federal officers; 23 the right to be protected from violence while
in the custody of the federal government;24 the right to re-enter the country;25
the right to inform the government of violations of its laws.26
The claim has frequently been made that state legislation has violated the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Until the decision in the
instant case, the Court has consistently refused to invalidate state legislation upon
this ground. One line of decisions has demonstrated that the guaranties of the first
eight amendments, from their adoption regarded as binding only the federal govern-
ment, have not been protected from state infringement by the privileges and
immunities clause.27 Other rights and privileges have been held not included within
the scope of the clause. Among these are the right to employ aliens,28 to sell
by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may
justly prescribe for the good of the whole."
16. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36, 79-80 (1873).
17. See Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 661 (1893); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S.
377, 382 (1894); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97 (1908); Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U. S. 245, 261 (1934). The clause is directed toward the prohibition of state, not
individual, action. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1880); Civil Rights Cases, 109'
U. S. 3 (1883); Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1 (1906). Corporations are not
included in the definition of "citizens." Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557 (1899).
18. The following enumeration is found in LONG, CASEs oN CONSTTUToNAL LAW
(2d ed. 1932) 107-109. None of the cases involved state legislation.
19. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U. S. *133 (1795); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsey,
6 U. S. 64 (1804).
20. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U. S. 35 (1867), in which the Court refused to test Its
decision upon the commerce clause. See also Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274 (1900).
21. United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76 (1884).
22. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1875).
23. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884).
24. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892).
25. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908).
26. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532 (1895). Most of the foregoing cases were pyosecutions
for violations of a federal statute prohibiting the infringement by individuals of the
privileges of citizens of the United States. The prohibitory statute in its present foYm Is
35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 51-59 (1927).
27. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875) (jury trial in civil cases) ; Presser v. Illinois,
116 U. S. 252 (1886) (right to bear arms); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890) (cruel
and unusual punishments); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900) (jury trial in criminal
cases); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) (compulsory self-incrimination).
But see GuTmuE, T=a FouR"mxNm A3mNDMENT (1898) 58-69.
28. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915).
RECENT DECISIONS
intoxicating liquors,29 to vote in a state,30 to have dower,31 to attend a land grant
college without studying military science, 32 to be a member of a secret organizationra
and to practice law in the state courts.3"
With respect to the right to engage in business, the Court has followed the
Slaughter House Cases in viewing the privilege as one of state, not national, citizen-
ship.35 Protection of the citizen against legislative interference with this right by
his own state is afforded by other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather
than the privileges and immunities clause. Upon similar reasoning a tax upon the
business of hiring persons to labor outside the state has been sustained, 0 and a tax
upon a debt owing from a non-resident has been declared not an abridgement of
any privilege or immunity of United States citizenship.37 In view of these decisions,
all of which have laid stress upon the fundamental nature of the privileges and
immunities of United States citizenship, it is difficult to agree with the majority
in the instant case that the right to make a loan in a foreign state is such a privilege.
An iron-clad rule of equality of taxation which the equal protection and due process
clauses have failed to impose is thus attained by breathing new life into the privi-
leges and immunities clause. In the welter of New Deal decisions, the importance
of the instant case may be overlooked, a case which tends appreciably to break
down the vanishing line which heretofore has rendered state legislation immune from
federal judicial review.
CORPORATIONs-DISREGARD OF CORPORATE ENTITY-CONTROL OF ONE SUBSMLRY
BY ANOTHER THROUGH CONTPAcr.-The Yellow Truck & Coach Mfg. Co. owned
all the stock in B Corporation, a manufacturing company, and in C Corporation, a
sales company. It also owned the controlling interest in D Corporation, the finance
company, all of the stock in the defendant corporation, Terminal Transportation
System Inc., the managing company, and 60% of the stock in four corporations
engaged in operating taxicabs, ownership of the remaining 40% being lodged in
interlocking directors. The defendant, owning concession contracts for taxicab service
at various terminals in New York City, contracted with the four operating corpora-
tions to fulfill those contracts. The cabs of the operating companies were alike in
color and design, and all bore the name "Terminal." The defendant, although it
did not own a share of stock in any of the four operating companies, kept the
books of the operating companies, drew their payroll checks, maintained a central
repair garage, hired mechanics, approved or disapproved prospective employees, and
designated the territories of the respective operating companies. The plaintiffs were
injured through the negligence of the driver of a "Terminal" cab, and sued the
defendant managing corporation. On motion for a directed verdict, held, that the
corporate entity of the four operating companies should be disregarded and the
defendant charged with liability. Mangan v. Terminal Transportation System Inc.,
157 Misc. 627, 248 N. Y. Supp. 183 (Sup. Ct 1935).
29. Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 85 U. S. 129 (1874) ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887);
Crowley v. Christianson, 137 U. S. 86 (1890); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657 (1893).
30. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U. S. 162 (1874); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904);
cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927).
31. Ferry v. Spokane, etc. R. Co., 258 U. S. 314 (1922).
32. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
33. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928).
34. Bradwell v. The State, 83 U. S. 130 (1873); In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116 (1894).
35. See notes 13, 28, suprm.
36. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 (1900) (tax on "emigrant agents").
37. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss. 100 U. S. 491 (1879).
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Scholars sharpen their wits on the wheel of corporate theory,1 but the courts
with an eye primarily to the practical aspects of the problem bow to the fiction or
ride roughshod over it, as the facts and justice may require. Call it fact or fiction,
it is established beyond dispute that the corporate entity will be cast aside under
certain circumstances, and the courts are rather keenly alive to actual truths, than
chary of their means of accomplishment. For example, the instant court is only one
of many which base the disregard of a defendant corporation's entity on the ground
that the tort-feasor corporation was its "agent or instrumentality." 2  The term
"agent" necessarily connotes a bi-partite relationship, that is, between a principal,
and an agent. "Instrumentality," on the other hand, negates this dualism and is
based on the identity behind a mere seeming individuality?3 The rationale of the
instrumentality theory would appear to be more in accord with the spirit of the
decisions, since in fact the ultimate holdings declare that the corporations involved
are not two or more, as the case may be, but one, and this is the true basis of
the liability consequently imposed. Clarity of expression is the more desirable in
the exposition of these cases, since the authorities themselves are in conflict as
to the proper application of the ordinary rules of agency.4 It has been asserted,
for example, that on a set of facts which would unquestionably spell out liability
on the theory of an implied in fact agency were the parties natural persons, the
result is exactly the opposite if the parties be corporations.5
The more vital phase of the problem, namely, what concrete circumstances will
justify the disregard of corporate immunity, is equally "enveloped in the mists of
metaphor." In attempting to draw working principles out of a chaotic mass of
facts and language, it has been suggested that in general two elements must be
present: an excessive control of the subsidiary by the parent, and, flowing therefrom,
an unjust loss or injury to the complainant.7 Logically, then, the use of an immunity
1. "Just what the corporation is, no two legal authorities are in accord." WoasRm,
DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FIcrxoN AN AALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1929) 3. This
volume contains an excellent discussion of the various theories of the corporate concept.
2. Instant case at 632, 284 N. Y. Supp. at 188.
3. 1 MVEcHz, LAW OF AOENCY (2d ed. 1914) §§ 63, 208. Thus an act such as the
signing of a written o " sealed instrument, which would in some jurisdictions require
authorization of equal dignity were there an agency, is not bound by the equal dignity
rule where there is a mere instrumentality.
4. Ballantine declares that most of the cases can be explained by a liberal application of
the ordina y agency rules. Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1925) 14 CAMi.
L. REv. 12, 19. Were the situation as simple as this, there would be no need for the library
that has grown up around the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Judge Cardozo in Berkey
v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 95, 155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926), indicates that where
dominion is very great liability will flow from the ordinary relationship of principal and
agent, but that where the control is less than this the abuse is "to be corrected by the Im-
plication of a merger." Powell criticizes this analysis, on the ground that it imposes the
agency liability at the point where domination becomes excessive, that is, at the very point
where the instrumentality rule itself becomes operative. The instrumentality rule is con-
fined as a result to cases of lesser control where ipso facto it is ineffectual. Powell urges
that the general principles of agency law are inapplicable except in cases involving an ex-
press agency. POWELL, PaENr AN SUBSIDIARY CORPORAIONS (1931) 92.
5. Ibid.
6. Judge Cardozo in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E.
58, 61 (1926). Professor Wormser suggests it is better that the law remain flexible to
meet the exigencies of each case. Woxasm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 37-40.
7. POWVELL, PARrr AND SUBsIDIARY CORPOIATIONS (1931) 4, sets up three requisites
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artificially created for legitimate purposes will not be permitted for illegitimate ends.8
The idea of undue control is by no means limited to cases of predominating or
even complete stock ownership.9 In fact, the exercise of control through the medium
of stock ownership will not of itself sustain an application of the doctrine,10 while
control over the subsidiary may be evidenced by mere mutual ownership in the hands
of those who control the dominant corporation.'- Dominance may, as in the instant
case, be achieved by contract,' 2 and the interposition of additional subsidiaries between
the parent corporation and the tort-feasor corporation is immaterial.'2 The court
will reach down through the entire chain, and lay its hand upon the guilty link.
Various other factors, such as failure to observe statutory requirefrlents,", common
personnel,' 5 the financing of the subsidiary by the parent,1 6 the inaugurating its
for the application of the doctrine, namely, control, defendant's fraud or wrong with
respect to the complainant and unjust loss or injury to the complainant. The sEcond
and third elements are certainly overlapping if not actually identical
S. WoauasR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 73: ". . . this fiction like every other fiction,
must be employed with common sense and applied so as to promote the ends of justice.'
9. In the instant case for example the defendant corporation owned no stock in the
tort-feasor corporation. See also Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed.
676 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 644 (1920).
10. Pullman Car Co. v. Missouri Pacific Co., 115 U. S. 587 (1885) (mere ownership
of all stock not sufficient); City of Winfield v. Wichita Natural Gas Co., 267 Fed. 47
(C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Hooper-Meinkin Co. v. Matthew Addy Co., 4 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A.
6th, 1925); Lange v. Burke, 69 Ark. 85, 61 S. W. 165 (1901); Continental & Comm'l
Trust & Say. Bank v. Garden City Co., 123 Kan. 659, 256 Pac. 983 (1927); Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 118 Atl. 279 (1922). The point
is well brought out by a comparison of United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U. S. 366 (1908) with United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 220 U. S. 257 (1910).
11. This was the situation in the instant case and in Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R.
Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920), cerl. denied, 254 U. S. 644 (1920). But
cf. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243 (1924) (two subsidiaries may as against each other
be independent although both are controlled by the same parent corporation).
12. In Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), the
subsidiary was deprived of its freedoma by written contract. The defendant owned a
street railroad. Its parent corporation contracted with a management corporation so that
a manager of the subsidiary's railroad was appointed, with power to hire employees, fix
salalies, and purchase supplies. The manager's actions were made subject only to the
supervision of the directors of the plaintiff corporation. Accord: Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490 (1918).
13. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 840 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904) (all corporations
in the chain held to be partners and as a result liable on agency principles); Lehigh Valley
R. Co. v. Delachesa, 145 Fed. 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906) (parent held liable on theory that
subsidiary was its agent).
14. Werner v. Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221 (1903).
15. Martin v. Development Co. of America, 240 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Hakell
v. M 'Clintic Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Owl Fumigating Co'rp.
v. California Cyanide Co., 24 F. (2d) 718 (D. Del. 1928); Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v.
Dwyer & Rhodes Co., 173 Wash. 552, 23 P. (2d) 1114 (1933).
16. City of Holland v. Holland City Gas Co., 257 Fed. 679 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919);
Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 24 F. (2d) 718 (D. Del. 1928); Berkey
v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926); see Peterson v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 205 U. S. 364, 393 (1907).
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incorporation, 17 the confining its activities to doing business with the parent alone,18
the treatment and description of the subsidiary as a department of the parent,10
stripping the subsidiary of assets, 20 are mere evidentiary facts of varying weight, not
conclusive as to the appropriateness of the application of the doctrine.
There remains the question of fraud upon the complainant. The courts uniformly
stress the "control" factor, while blurring the outlines of the element of fraud under
a heavy cloak of verbiage.2 1 In the leading New York case, Berkey v. Third Avenue
Railway Co.,22 no mention was made in the opinion of loss resulting to the plaintiff
from a refusal to disregard the corporate entity of the defendant. This of itself
should justify the decision in the absence of a showing to the contrary. In the
instant case, on the other hand, it was noted that due to the nature of the accident
and the appearance of the cabs, the plaintiffs did not and could not obtain or
furnish the name of the operating company owning the cab, or its license number.
It would seem that here is the real crux of the problem. The Court of Appeals
has on more than one occasion taken cognizance of a fact frequently overlooked-
that the corporate form is rightfully employed, and was in truth created, for the
very purpose of limiting liability.2 3 The refusal to recognize corporate immunity is
contrary to a basic policy underlying the modem economic structure and should be
resorted to only in cases where, contingent upon the needs of the particular com-
plainant, it is essential to prevent the perpetration of a fraud.24
17. Interstate Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Tel. Co., 51 Fed. 49 (C. C. D. Md. 1892),
aff'd, 54 Fed. 50 (C. C. A. 4th, 1893); Joseph R. Foalrd Co. v. State of Md., 219 Fed.
827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914); Portsmouth Oil Refining Corp. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 280
Fed. 879 (D. Ala. 1922).
18. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 176 Fed. 362 (C. C. A. 3d,
1910).
19. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 97, 155 N. E. 58, 62 (1926).
20. This element, however, is of great weight and its presence ordinarily results in an
application of the doctrine. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 176
Fed. 362 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910); Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676
(C. C. A. 4th, 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 644 (1920).
21. For example the fraud element is frequently hidden in expressions to the effect
that the doctrine will be applied "as the justice of the case may require," United States
v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 63 (1920); "to the tests of honesty and justice," Berkey
v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 95, 155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926); "in a proper case,"
Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 579, 230 Pac. 633, 635 (1924).
22. 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926).
23. Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924); Jenkins v. Moyse,
254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930).
24. California has held squarely that the corporate entity will be disregarded only when
necessa ry to protect the rights of third parties, and has denied relief when no case of
fraud or wrong has been made out. Erkenbrecher v. Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641
(1921); Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Wenban Estate, Inc. v.
Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924). Washington follows the same reasoning.
First Nat. Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928); Briggs & Co. v. Harper
Clay Products Co., 150 Wash. 235, 272 Pac. 962 (1928). Some of the federal courts
have recognized the importance of this question, and it was held in Texas Co. of Mexico
v. Roos, 43 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), that the parent corporation's control of the
subsidiary was immaterial in the absence of proof of the exercise of that power in such
manne'r as to cause a wrong or injury to the complaining party. Cf. Matter of Winburn,
136 Misc. 19, 240 N. Y. Supp. 208 (Surr. Ct. 1930) (no finding of control; corporate entity
disregarded merely in interest of justice).
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Cm A AI. LAw-DouBLE JEOPAmDY-EFFECT or Wmr or HAl mis Conpus.-The
relator was tried before a police court and jury for the crinme of disorderly conduct.
The trial, which resulted in a conviction, was begun on Saturday and was completed
on Sunday when sentence was imposed. On application, the relator was released
on a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal, inasmuch
as the proceedings on Sunday were void by statute.1 He was rearrested upon the
same information for the same offense, and before trial sought another writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that a second trial would subject him to double jeopardy. On
appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division, which reversed a judgment of
the Special Term granting the writ, held, one judge dissenting, that a new trial would
place the relator in double jeopardy. Judgment reversed. People ex rel Meyer v.
Warden of the County Jail, Nassau County, 269 N. Y. 426, 199 N. E. 647 (1936).
The Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall be twice
jeopardized for the same offense, 2 and a similar provision has been incorporated
into the constitutions of most of the individual states&3 A defendant is in jeopardy
when he has been placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon an
indictment sufficient to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been sworn to try him.4
Where no circumstances exist which call for or permit the exercise of discretion,
and the jury has been arbitrarily discharged by the court, the defendant has been
placed in jeopardy, and may successfully avail himself of the constitutional immunity
against a second trial of the same offense.5 However, where the accused expressly
consents, 6 or where his assent may be implied from his failure to objectT to the
discharge, he is deemed to have waived his right to be immune from further jeopardy.
Nor may the right be exercised where the trial has been interrupted in a manner
which would preduae an impartial continuance of it,8 since in such instance the
1. N. Y. JUDIIRARY LAW (1907) § 5. It has been held that a verdict of a jury may
properly be received on Sunday. Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178 (1897); Baxter
v. People, 3 Gilman *368 (I1. 1846); Hoghtaling v. Osborn, 15 Johns. *119 (NT. Y. 1818);
Butler v. Kelsey, 15 Johns. *177 (N. Y. 1818); Story v. Elliot, 8 Cowen 27 (N. Y. 1827).
2. U. S. CONST. AimND. V.
3. E.g., CAr. Coxnsr. art. I, § 13; ILL. Co;sr. art. II, § 10; N. J. Co.,sr. art. I, § 10;
N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; OHIo Coxs?. art. VIII, § 11; PA. CoxsT. art. I, § 10. Inasmuch
as the first ten amendments of the Constitution of the United States are binding only
upon the federal government [Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900)], it is nece-ary for
the'states to enact statutes or adopt constitutional provisions to prevent double jeopardy.
4. It is necessary that each of these elements be present to constitute a valid jeopardy;
if any one is lacking, jeopardy will not attach. Nordlinger v. United States, 24 App.
D. C. 406 (1904); United States v. Kraut, 2 F. Supp. 16 (S. D. N. Y. 1932); State v.
Miller, 331 Mo. 675, 56 S. W. (2d) 92 (1932); King v. People, 5 Hun 297 (N. Y. 1875);
People v. Goldfarb, 152 App. Div. 870, 138 N. Y. Supp. 62 (lst Dep't 1912), aIfd, 213
N. Y. 664, 107 N. E. 1083 (1914); Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S. E.
257 (1933); CoorLz, CoTsrrroxAL LmrrrArroxs (8th ed. 1927) 686, 687.
5. People ex rel. Stabile v. Warden, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911).
6. State v. Woo Dak San, 35 N. M. 93, 290 Pac. 322 (1930).
7. Mahany v. People, 31 Colo. 365, 73 Pac. 26 (1903) (defendant excepted in the
usual form to a void verdict, but made no objection to the discharge of -the jury);
Commonwealth v. Sholes, 95 Mass. 554 (1866) (silence deemed con-cent to discharge of jury).
8. McCall v. State, 23 Ga. App. 770, 99 S. E. 471 (1919) (prejudicial remarks by the
court in hearing of jury are ground for motion for mistrial) ; State v. Slorab, 118 Be. 203,
106 Atl. 768 (1919) (prejudicial statement by accused in prmsence of jury); People v.
Diamond, 231 Mich. 484, 204 N. W. 105 (1925) (jurors in conversation with defendant's
daughter during a recess).
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accused is said to be benefited by the retrial, in that it would be prejudicial to him
to allow the first trial to continue. Where a jury is unable to agree on a verdict,
and the court, exercising sound discretion, orders its discharge, the defendant may
be retried since in such case the jeopardy is held to be merely interrupted but no
new jeopardy is imposed by the second trial.9
The most familiar form of waiver of the double jeopardy defense is an appeal.
Since the defendant himself requests the new trial of an offense for which he has been
once convicted, an appeal is tantamount to a waiver,10 and by seeking a correction
of errors, the accused consents to a retrial in a proper manner.11 In the case
at bar, the accused had a choice of remedy to cure the defect of the trial, and he
elected to proceed by habeas corpus rather than by appeal. A writ of habeas corpus
does not take the place of an appeal,12 but is concerned only with questions of
jurisdiction.'3 Although a writ of habeas corpus has this limited legal effect, the
relator in the instant case was in reality attacking the validity of the conviction by
the use of the writ. Bearing in mind that the rationale of interpreting an appeal
as a waiver is based upon the fact that a defendant by his own act attacks the
validity of the prior conviction and therefore is estopped to set up the defense
of double jeopardy,14 it is submitted that the accused in the instant case should be
similarly estopped. Had the relator endeavored to correct the error by appeal,
admittedly he would have waived his constitutional right. To uphold the second
writ of habeas corpus, in the case at bar, is to place a premium upon ingenuity,
and as the dissenting judge states, "... to place form and technicality above
substance."' 5
CRIMINAL LAw-LARCENY By GENERAL OWNER FROM LIENHOLDER.--The defendant
engaged M to repair her fur coat for $50, the agreed price to include any necessary
addition of skins. When M brought the coat to the defendant's home and requested
payment, the defendant obtained possession of the coat through fraud. The defendant
9. People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. *301 (N. Y. 1801); People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns.
*187 (N. Y. 1820); People v. Green, 13 Wend. 55 (N. Y. 1834); State v. Nelson, 19 R. I.
467, 34 At]. 990, 33 L. R. A. 559 (1896) ; see N. Y. CODE CnMM. Paoc. (1881) § 428.
10. Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521 (1905); People v. Qlwell, 28 Cal. 456
(1865); Gibson v. Somers, 31 Nev. 531, 103 Pac. 1073 (1909); People v. Palmfer, 109
N. Y. 413, 17 N. E. 213 (1888); cf. State v. Clark, 69 Iowa 196, 28 N. W. 537 (1886)
(motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment); People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50
N. W. 995 (1891) (accused sought review by certiorari); State v. Diaz, 36 N. M. 284, 13 P.
(2d) 883 (1932) (mistrial on motion of accused); People v. Casborus, 13 Johns. '351
(N. Y. 1816) (arrest of judgment at instance of defendant).
11. People v. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 478 (1881). An appeal for a new trial by the de-
fendant also has been viewed as a request to proceed as if no trial had previously taken
place. See People v. McGrath, 202 N. Y. 445, 451, 96 N. E. 92, 94 (1911). After a
reversal on appeal, the accused may be convicted of a higher degree of the crime on the
new trial. People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 413, 17 N. E. 213 (1888).
12. People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921); People ex rel.
Bellanca v. Moran, 235 App. Div. 317, 257 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1st Dep't 1932); People
ex rel. Holt v. Lambert, 237 App. Div. 39, 260 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1st Dep't 1932).
13. People ex rel. Hubert v. Kaiser, 206 N. Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195 (1912); Bandy v.
Hehn, 10 Wyo. 167, 67 Pac. 979 (1902).
14. People v. Qiwell, 28 Cal. 456 (1865); Gibson v. Somers, 31 Nev. 531, 103 Pac.
1073 (1909).
15. See dissenting opinion of Finch, J., instant case at 432, 199 N. E. at 650.
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was tried and convicted of larceny in the second degree of the entire coat. On
appeal, held, conviction affirmed. State v. Cohen, 263 N. W. 922 (Minn. 1935).
Although the situation is of rare occurrence, it is well established that a general
owner may be guilty of the larceny of his own chattel.' This proposition at first
glance appears to be in glaring conflict with the fundamental definition of larceny as
the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another,- but this
difficulty is resolved by a recognition of the possible existence of divided property
interests in the same goods 3 Thus an allegation of a special property will sustain
an indictment for larceny against the holder of the title.4 The situations wherein
the problem will arise may be discussed under four headings:5 (1) where there is
a simple bailment; (2) where property is pledged; (3) where it has been levied
upon, or is in the hands of a receiver; and (4) where the bailee has an interest
in the property in the nature of a common law or statutory lien.
Prior to the early part of the nineteenth century, the only reported cases' on this
problem fell within the first classification.0 These cases recognized the possibility
of a larceny by the owner of his own goods when they were taken from the bailee
with intent to charge the latter with the full value thereof.7 Since the ultimate
result of this taking deprived the bailee of his interest therein and of the monetary
equivalent of the goods themselves as well, it was reasonable to hold this a larceny
of the entire property. The authorities agree that a pledgee has a special property
interest in the article pledged which upon default may be satisfied out of a sale.8
Reasoning from this basis, it has been held that the general owner may be guilty
of larceny of the pledged article9 where by fraud or stealth he obtains possession
from the pledgee with felonious intent to deprive the latter of his lien.' o Similarly,
the attaching creditor acquires by the attachment a qualified property right." But
1. 2 WHART N, Csnn.AT LAw (12th ed. 1932) § 1177.
2. 4 BL. CoMM. *299.
3. See Pease v. Pease, 189 Ill. 456, 468, 59 N. E. 983, 986 (1901) ; Moulton v. Witherell,
52 Me. 237, 242, 243 (1863); Stief v. Hart, 1 N. Y. 20, 25 (1847).
4. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 104 Mass. 552 (1870); State v. Brown, 72 N. .. L.
354, 60 At. 1117 (1905); People v. McDonald, 43 N. Y. 61 (1870).
5. This article is not concerned with the situation wherein the chattel mortgagor sells
or removes mortgaged property without the mortgagees consent. The majority of states
have penal statutes directed against this specific offense. See CAL. Pm-. Con (Deering,
1931) § 538; IDAho CoDE ANN. (1932) c. 17, § 3907; Irr. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1935) c. 9S
§ 8; MAss. ANNm. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 266, § 83; Mnmu. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
c. 101, § 10395; N. Y. P=AL LAW (1909) § 940.
6. Anonymous, Jenkins 56, 145 Eng. Reprints 40 (Ex. 1428) (earliest reported case);
MacDaniel's Case, Fost. C. L. 121, 168 Eng. Reprints 60 (Crown Cas. 1755). See State
v. Braden, 2 Overt 67 (Tenn. 1805) for a decision expressly confining the principle to this
situation.
7. People v. Stone, 16 Cal. 369 (1860); State v. Fitzpatrick, 9 Houst. 385, 32 Ad. 1072
(Del. 1885).
8. JoN=s, CoLLATERAL SEcuRnEs (3d ed. 1912) §§ 2, 720, 729. ScnouL n, BAuM1-nr-rs
(3d ed. 1897) 167.
9. Hen.ry v. State, 110 Ga. 750, 36 S. E. 55 (1900); Bruley v. Rose, 57 Iowa 651, 11
N. W. 629 (1882); State v. Hubbard, 126 Kan. 129, 266 Pac. 939 (1928); State Bank
of Shawnee v. MacMahan, 45 Okda. 585, 146 Pac. 1 (1915); cf. Newell v. State, 16 Ga.
App. 380, 85 S. E. 353 (1915); State v. Braden, 2 Overt 67 (Tenn. 1805).
10. Taylor v. State, 7 Tex. App. 659 (1880) (fact that property was taken from pledgee
after debt was discharged held to negative a felonious intent).
11. Commonwealth v. Greene, 111 Mass. 392 (1873).
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before the general owner may be guilty of larceny of his own property after it has
been levied upon' 2 it must appear that the taking was felonious 13 and that he had
been informed of the levy. 14 So also, a felonious taking from the possession of the
court's receiver has been held to constitute a larceny.15
The most prevalent example of larceny by a general owner of his own goods
occurs, however, in the case of property taken from the lienholder with intent to
deprive the latter of his lien. This protection has been given to such lienholders
as carriers, 16 livery stable-keepers and agisters,17 boarding and lodging house
keepers,' 8 landlords,1 and repairmen.20 In view of the fact that the lienholder in
hn action of trover or trespass against the general owner may recover only the value
of his lien2 ' it seems illogical and inequitable that the value of the entire property,
rather than the interest acquired by the lienholder, should measure the quantut of
the larceny.2 2 In those states where larceny is characterized as grand or petit
larceny2 such a distinction would have a vital effect upon the seriousness of the
offense as indicated by the instant case.
2 4
FALSE IMPRISONMENT-PROBABLE CAUSE AS A DEFNSE-The defendant's detective
and her assistant testified that they saw the plaintiff pilfer articles from the defen-
dant's counters and put them in his pockets. Intercepting him at the main exit,
they accused him of shop-lifting. After a detention of twenty minutes, during which
period the merchandise was discovered in his pockets, a police officer was summoned
and arrested him. The plaintiff was acquitted of the criminal charge and brought
an action for false imprisonment. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held,
that the defendant had the right to detain the plaintiff for investigation, since the
plaintiff had given the defendant reasonable cause to suspect that he was shop-lifting.
Judgment reversed. Collyer v. Kress Corp., 54 P. (2d) 20 (Cal. 1936).
12. Ayers v. State, 3 Ga. App. 305, 59 S. E. 924 (1907); Whiteside v. Loney, 171 Mass.
431, 50 N. E. 931 (1898). Contra: Clarke v. State, 41 Neb. 370, 59 N. W. 785 (1894);
State v. Cornelius, 5 Ore. 46 (1873).
13. Commonwealth v. Greene, 111 Mass. 392 (1873); Adams v. State, 45 N. J. L. 448
(Sup. Ct. 1883).
14. Kirk v. Commonwealth, 14 S. W. 1089 (Ky., 1891); State v. Dewitt, 32 Mo. 571
(1862); Palmer v. People, 10 Wend. 165 (N. Y. 1833).
15. State v. Rivers, 60 Iowa 381, 14 N. W. 738 (1883).
16. Hall v. United States, 277 Fed. 19 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Atchison T. & S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Hinsdell, 76 Kan. 74, 90 Pac. 800 (1907).
17. People v. Cain, 7 Cal. App. 163, 93 Pac. 1037 (1908); Tumalty v. Parker, 100 Ill.
App. 382 (1902); State v. Nelson, 36 Wash. 126, 78 Pac. 790 (1904).
18. Regina v. Holingsworth, 4 Terr. L. R. 168, 15 Eng. & Emp. Dig. 900 (Can. 1899);
Regina v. Hough, 15 N. S. W. L. R. 204 (1892).
19. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 12 Pa. D. & C. 644, 645 (1903).
20. State v. Stephen, 32 Tex. 156 (1869).
21. Outcalt v. Durling, 25 N. J. L. 443 (1856); Spoor v. Holland, 8 Wend. 445 (N. Y.
1832); see Fowler v. Haynes, 91 N. Y. 346, 351 (1885); JONEs, Lims (3d ed. 1914) § 1035.
22. The cases cited in footnotes 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 supra all
held the larceny to be of the entire property.
23. For example, see N. Y. PENAL LAW (1912) §§ 1294 (3), 1295 (3), 1298.
24. See instant case at 924, where the court said: "We take it that in this prosecution
the only value in issue was the value of the coat which defendant feloniously took and
concealed. . . . And defendant was not entitled to have the amount of M's posqesso1y
lien determined in this criminal case."
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As a general principle, the owner of property has an inherent right to restrain
another from stealing it. Thus the rule enunciated in the instant case, that the
owner of property has a right to detain, in a reasonable manner, another whom he
has reasonable grounds to suspect of stealing his property, requires little persuasion
to justify it. The right to one's property is strangely limited if one must stand idle
when there is serious ground to suspect that another, in the guise of purchaser, is
shop-lifting from one's open counters.' Such a restriction substantially qualifies
control over one's goods, for one must either detain the object of suspicion, at the
risk of an action for false imprisonment, if it turns out that the suspicion was not
in fact well founded, or he must suffer the suspect to go his way, taking the property
with him.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the courts have adopted the rule followed in
the instant case.2 They are unanimous in requiring that the accused be detained
only when the circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that a
theft is being accomplished,3 and that he bie questioned only for a reasonable period
in a fair manner 4 It is for the court to determine whether or not the circumstances
as found by the jury were sufficient to support the suspicions and for the jury to
pass on the reasonableness of the investigation.6
Included in the group rejecting the defense of probable cause in these actions are
Ohio7 and New York.8 An Ohio court has gone so far as to say that even if the
suspect has in fact stolen the merchandise, the owner may not detain him The
New York decisions rest on a strict interpretation of the statute which provides
that a private person may arrest another for a crime committed or attempted in his
presence.' 0 It follows that if a crime has in fact been committed, the existence or
1. At common law a private person may arrest another whom he suspects on reason-
able grounds of having committed a felony. There is no authority fo'r arrecting on sus-
picion of a misdemeanor, except that which is given by statute. Suo.asa, Lrw or ToIrs
(7th ed. 1928) § 119.
2. Takahashi v. Hecht Co., 64 Fed. (2d) 710 ( App. D. C. 1933); Newberry Co. v. Judd,
259 Ky. 309, 82 S. W. (2d) 359 (1935); Standish v. Narragansett Steamship Co., 111 Mass.
512 (1873); Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N. E. 843, 26 A. L. R.
1333 (1923); Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 815, 141 S. E. 860 (1928); see Dillon v. Sears-
Roebuck Co., 125 Neb. 269, 272, 249 N. W. 604, 605 (1933).
3. In F. S. Marshall Co. v. Brashear, 37 S. W. (2d) 15, 17 (Ky. 1931) the court points out
that the circumstances are not to be judged in the light of a subsequent conviction or acquittal
of the theft charge. In this case the accused who was discovered concealing the article within
her coat was acquitted. So also, the plaintiff was acquitted in the instant case, although the
articles were found in his pockets.
4. Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N. E. 843 (1923). Cortra:
F. S. Marshall Co. v. Brashear, 37 S. W. (2d) 15 (Ky. 1931) (mistreatment is not material
on the question of false imprisonment).
5. Macde v. Ambassador Hotel Corp., 123 Cal. App. 215, 11 P. (2d) 3 (1932); Allen v.
McCoy, 137 Cal. App. 500, 27 P. (2d) 423 (1933); cf. Hawley v. Butler, 54 Barb. 490, 504
(N. Y. 1868).
6. See note 5, supra.
7. Fitscher v. Rollnan & Sons Co., 31 Ohio App. 340M, 167 N. E. 469 (1929).
8. Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381 (1868); Tobin v. Bell, 73 App. Div. 41, 76 N. Y. Supp.
425 (4th Dep't 1902); Johnston v. Bruckheimer, 133 App. Div. 649, 118 N. Y. Supp. 189
(Ist Dep't 1909); Gearity v. Strasbourger, 133 App. Div. 701, 118 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1st
Dep't 1909).
9. Fitscher v. Rolinan & Sons Co., 31 Ohio App. 340; 167 N. E. 469 (1929).
10. See McLoughlin v. New York Edison Co., 252 N. Y. 202, 169 N. E. 277 (1929)
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non-existence of probable cause for the suspicion is immaterial.11 There being no
provision expressly embracing arrest without a warrant on the suspicion of a crime,
the courts have refused to legislate such a provision into their decisions.12 This
refusal is grounded, perhaps, in the danger of subjecting the general public to the
inquisitorial abuses of such a privilege which might readily result in the hands of
a rash and imprudent individual. Such instances have in fact been recorded.13
While this may be admirable from the viewpoint of the judicial function, the owner
of property and the detectives hired to protect it, are deprived of an effective in-
strument in the administration of criminal justice.
INCOME TAX-PRoFIT ON SALE OF SECURITIES---"FIRST-IN-FIRST-OUT" RULE.-On
Feb. 25, 1929, the petitioner, holder of 1725 shares of X Corp. stock, purchased
on different occasions and at various prices, ordered his broker to sell 500 shares
of this stock, designating the sale in writing as being made against purchases of speci-
fied dates at specified prices. The resulting profit was included in his income tax
return as gross income. The stock certificates delivered by the broker against this
sale included two 100 share certificates purchased at different dates than those desig-
nated by the customer, and one 100 share certificate which could not be identi-
fied with any purchase. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue computed the
profit on the first 200 shares by using the purchase price with which the certificates
were identified. As to the unidentified 100 shares he applied the so-called "first-in-
first-out" rule of section 58 U. S. Treasury Regulations 741 and considered the sale
as having been made against the taxpayer's earliest purchase. On this basis the tax-
payer was assessed a deficiency in his income tax payment. The Board of Tax
Appeals2 upheld the Commissioner's stand. On appeal, held, that the "first-in-first.
out" rule applied only in the absence of identification and that the taxpayer's written
designation provided the requisite identification and, further, that it prevailed over
the identification by the certificates. Order of Board of Tax Appeals reversed.
Miller v. Conimissioner of Internal Revenue, 80 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
for a construction of N. Y. CODE CRa. PROC. (1881) § 183; Smith v. Bell Foundry Co., 127
App. Div. 278, 111 N. Y. Supp. 202 (2d Dep't 1908); Stevens v. O'Neill, 51 App. Div. 364,
64 N. Y. Supp. 663 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd, 169 N. Y. 375, 62 N. E. 424 (1902); see Legis.
(1936) 5 FoRDHAm L. REv. 338.
11. Compare the rule as to unlawful searcnes and seizures under the Fourth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution, where the fact that evidence or contraband was found does
not cure the defect of lack of probable cause in the first instance. Amos v. United States,
255 U. S. 313 (1921) ; Carrol v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925).
12. Rodney v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 149 Misc. 271, 267 N. Y. Supp. 86
(Sup. Ct. 1932); cf. Foulke v. New York Consol. R. Co., 228 N. Y. 269, 127 N. E. 237,
9 A. L. R. 1388 (1920), where although the plaintiff had been acquitted of petit larceny,
the court dismissed his action for: false imprisonment on the ground that his carrying a
mislaid package out of the defendant's car with felonious intent might well have authorized
a finding of guilt by the jury. For a criticism of judicial legislation in these actions, see
(1923) 22 MIcn. L. REv. 73.
13. Dunlevy v. Wolferman, 106 Mo. App. 46, 79 S. W. 1165 (1904); Jacques v. Childs
Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N. E. 843 (1923).
1. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretaly, prescribes and publishes all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this chapter. 48 STAT. 700, 26 U. S.
C. A. § 62 (1934).
2. The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court, but is an executive or administrative board
upon the decision of which parties are given an opportunity to base a petition for revlow
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Art. 22 (a)-8 U. S. Treasury Regulations 863 provides "If shares of stock in a
corporation are sold from lots purchased at different dates or at different prices and
the identity of the lots can not be determined, the stock sold shall be charged against
the earliest purchases of such stock." This regulation, tersely termed the "first-in-
first-out" rule, creates a rebuttable presumption that a stockholder disposes of his
earliest purchases first.4 It casts upon him the burden of establishing the contrary
by satisfactory evidence of the identity of the particular stock disposed of.5 Con-
cededly the rule is arbitrary and may be justified solely because it is necesary, reason-
able, and promotes uniformity.6 However, unduly stringent requisites for identifica-
tion may result in a deprivation of the stockholder's right to dispose of such portion
of his property as he may elect.7 In those instances where the ta:Npayer's holdings
were acquired at widely variant prices the amount of reportable income depends
to a considerable degree upon his right to designate the particular purchases of stock
disposed of.8 When it is realized that absolutely no stigma attaches to the indi-
vidual attempting to keep his tax burden down to a minimum and that his right
to the courts. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929). The author-
ity for the Board is found in 44 STAT. 105, 106, 108, 659 (1926), 45 STAT. 871 (1928), 26 U. S.
C. A. §§ 601-605 (1935). Provision for judicial review of the Board's decisions is set forth
in 44 STAT. 109 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 640 et seq. (1935). The circuit courts cannot
review facts found to exist by the Board. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935).
3. This regulation under art. 22 (a) of the Revenue Act (1934) is identically the same
as § 58, regulation 58, Revenue Act (1928).
4. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935) ; Skinner v. Eaton, 45 F. (2d) 563 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930).
5. Shares of stock ate identifiable for income tax purposes. De Ganay v. Lederer, 250
U. S. 376 (1919); Towne v. McElfigott, 274 Fed. 960 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Skinner v.
Eaton, 45 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). A mere intention to dispose of particular
shares without further designation does not constitute sufficient identification. Snyder v.
Commissioner, 295 U. S. 134 (1935); Horne v. Commilioner, 78 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A.
3d, 1935); A. F. Mack, 31 B. T. A. 1149 (1935) (notation by own bookkcepzr inmufficient).
6. Snyder v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931); Commisioner v. Mer-
chants' & Manufacturers' Fire Ins. Co., 72 F. (2d) 403 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934); s.e Commis-
sione v. Von Gunten, 76 F. (2d) 670, 671 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935); Commissioner v. Oliver, 78
F. (2d) 561, 562 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935). Wisconsin, for its state income tax, has adopted the
average cost of lots purchased as the basis of computing profit or loss. Long v. Kelley, 203
Wis. 668, 242 N. W. 562 (1932) ; cf. Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 1oth, 1930)
(regarding the federal rule as more practicable).
7. Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); see Helvering v. Ranki,
295 U. S. 123, 129 (1935).
8. The following are some of the factors to be accorded consideration in making a
selection: (1) Capital gains are taxable as income during the year in which the transaction
culminates. Snyder v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 134 (1935). (2) The amount of gain or
loss to be taken into account in computing net income varies from 100% to 30%o in inverse
ratio to the length of time the capital asset was held. 48 STAT. 714, 26 U. S. C. A. § 101 (a)
(1934). (3) Losses are allowable deductions to the extent of gain in other capital trans-
actions plus an additional $2,000 deductible from income from no matter what source de-
rived. Ibid. (4) In addition to the normal tax there is a surtax varying from 45 to 59,
depending on the amount of income [49 STAT. 1014, 26 U. S. C. A. § 12 (b) (1935)] and
the taxpayer must determine the likelihood of being in a higher or lower bracket in subse-
quent years. For a thorough discuson see Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: CaPllal Gains
and Losses (1935) 49 HARV. L. Rtv. 262.
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to avail himself of every legal means of doing so has long been recognized,0 it was
to be expected that the courts would seize upon any reliable indication of the identity
of the particular shares sold rather than apply the arbitrary "first-in-first-out" rule.
Thus it was early recognized that one who had made several outright purchases of
stock in a corporation, receiving on each occasion a certificate representing that pur-
chase, could sufficiently identify a sale with any one of these purchases by delivery
of the particular certificate received. The "first-in-first-out" rule was not applied in
this situation and the gain or loss was determined by the cost and proceeds of
the shares represented by that certificate.10 Undue significance, however, eventually
attached to the certificate itself, the courts losing sight of the fact that the shares
of stock, not the stock certificate, were being sold and that while the latter was a
reliable and usual means of identifying the former, it was not the sole method of
identification.'1 This tendency resulted in several circuit court decisions holding
that even conceding an intention on the part of the holder to dispose of certain
shares of stock, the inadvertent delivery against the sale, by him or by his broker,
of certificates representing other and different shares was controlling.' 2 The real
and important difficulty however arose out of margin transactions to which the
"first-in-first-out" rule was primarily intended to apply.la From the very nature of
this transaction the purchaser acquires title to no particular identifiable stock certi-
ficate. Therefore, regarding the certificate as virtually the sole means of identification,
the Board of Tax Appeals repeatedly held that it was impossible for the holder of
several lots of a particular stock in a marginal account to identify any specific pur-
chase.14 However, the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Rankinr5 definitely extended
the possibility of identification to such transactions, holding that the purchaser of
several lots of stock in a margin account could avoid the application of the "first-in-
first-out" rule by giving instructions to his broker, at or prior to the time of sale,
identifying the particular lots to be sold by price and date of purchase. Under the
impetus of this decision the instant court has swung to a diametrically opposite view
9. Superior Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390 (1930) ; Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U. S. 465 (1935); Commissioner v. Eldridge, 79 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
10. Commissioner v. Merchants' & Manufacturers' Fire Ins. Co., 72 F. (2d) 408 (C, C.
A. 3d, 1934); Homer v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935); Cleveland
Trust Co., 24 B. T. A. 132 (1931) ; Louis B. Neville, 29 B. T. A. 450 (1933) ; Helen V. Kelch-
ner, 31 B. T. A. 262 (1934).
11. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935); Towne v. McElligott, 274 Fed. 960 (S.
D. N. Y. 1921); see Jellinik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1, 13 (1900); cases
cited note 16, infra. Ownership follows the owner of the shares, not the holder of the
certificate. Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F. (2d) 577 (C, C. A. 10th, 1930). Cf. Mickler Holding
Co., 29 B. T. A. 300 (1933).
12. Commissioner v. Merchants' & Manufacturers' Fire Ins. Co., 72 F. (2d) 408 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1934); Horner v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) (what
was done, not what might have been done). See also, Cole v. Helburn, 4 F. Supp. 230
(W. D. Ky. 1933). Contra: Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930).
13. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935); Snyder v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d)
57 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
14. Burdett Stryker, 21 B. T. A. 561 (1930); Christian F. Leng, 22 B. T. A. 149 (1931);
Ralph H. Seelye, 29 B. T. A. 695 (1934). The identity of stock sold is not established by
a mere declaration that it represents certain shares of different lots purchased. Mickler
Holding Co., 29 B. T. A. 300 (1933). In accord, see opinion of Stone, 3., concurring
in result in Snyder v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 134, 142 (1935).
15. 295 U. S. 123 (1935).
[Vol. 5
RECENT DECISIONS
from that taken by the circuits courts previously adverted to, and has held that not
alone will a written designation to the broker of the particular purchases desired to
be disposed of, serve to identify the sales, but that this identification will prevail over
a conflicting identification by the certificate. The court, in a dictum, carefully
limits this, saying that such means of identification, adopted after the sale, would not
serve as a sufficient designation. The decision, refusing to frustrate the intention of
the stockholder, is a thoroughly practical one, recognizing both the very secondary
consideration given by brokers to a particular stock certificate, because of its fungible
nature,' 6 and the many ways in which the identity of a certificate may be lost through
mergers, exchanges, reorganizations, split-ups, stock dividends and the like.17 The
salient feature standing out in relief today is that the courts are endeavoring to effec-
tuate the actual intention of the taxpayer whenever that may reliably be obtained
from overt acts prior to or at the time of sale.
NEGLIGENCE-INFANTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS JuRY QUESTI.-An action
was brought for personal injuries sustained when a child of six upon alighting from
a car ran around the rear of it upon the highway and was struck by the defendant's
automobile. A motion for a new trial by the plaintiff was granted on the ground
that a child so young could not be guilty of contributory negligence. On appeal,
held, that the question of contributory negligence was properly one of fact for the
jury. Eckhardt v. Hanson, 264 N. W. 776 (Minn. 1936).
The authorities are divided with respect to the rule to be applied in determining
the capacity of children to be guilty of contributory negligence.' However, two
contrary views have received the greatest support.2 The doctrine more generally
adhered to is that commonly referred to as the Illinois rule,3 although the so-called
Massachusetts rule has received the approbation of many jurisdictions.&4 Under the
16. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365 (1903); Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U. S. 90 (1912);
Gorman v. Littlefield, 229 U. S. 19 (1913).
17. Each of these situations presents a separate problem the explanation of which is very
technical and beyond the scope of this discussion. For succinct analysis see 1 Fed. Tax
Service (C. C. H. 1936) Uff 801-803 B. 12.
1. For a consideration of the law of contributory negligence, see Bohlen, Contributory
Negligence (1908) 21 HAv. L. Rxv. 233; while the problem of imputation to the child
of the parent's negligence is fully considered in 1 SHE_ u.r' Aim REDr='IE, Nraurcnmcz (6th
ed. 1913) §§ 74-84.
2. See Note L. R. A. 1917F 10; Wilderman, Presumptions Existing in Favor of the
Infant in re: The Question of an Infant's Liability to Be Guilty of Contributory Negligence
(1935) 10 Itn. L. J. 427; McDonald . O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589, 599, 78 Pac. 753, 757 (1904);
(1929) 27 MICH. L. REv. 964.
3. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Cusimano, 206 Ala. 689, 91 So. 779 (1921); Chicago
City Ry. Co. v. Touhy, 196 Il. 410, 63 N. E. 997 (1902); Johnson v. Herring, 69 Mont.
420, 300 Pac. 535 (1931); Stevenson v. Sarfert, 310 Pa. 458, 165 Ad. 225 (1933); Dodd v.
Spartansburg Ry, etc. Co., 95 S. C. 9, 78 S. E. 525 (1913); see Note L. R. A. 1917F 10, 60.
4. Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 285, 114 Ati. 81 (1921); Sullivan v. Boston
El. Ry. Co., 192 Mlass. 37, 78 N. E. 382 (1906); Hirrell v. Lacey, 274 AL-. 431, 174
N. E. 679 (1931); Ritscher v. Orange & P. V. R. Co, 79 N. J. L. 462, 7S At]. 209 (Sup.
Ct. 1910); Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 132, 106 Ad. 682 (1919). Much
confusion has been caused in determining the policy of many jurisdictions as a result of
some of the decisions rendered by the courts. For example, "It is of course well estab-
lished that a child of 3Y/ years of age cannot itself be chargeable with contributory negli-
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Illinois rule, an analogy has been drawn to the criminal law by establishing a con-
clusive presumption of the child's incapacity until he reaches the age of seven.5
On the other hand, the Massachusetts rule regards the question of contributory
negligence in a child of any age as one of fact. It is to be observed that the
Massachusetts rule does not attempt to remove age as a determining factor, but
rather contemplates that the jury is sufficiently competent to judge whether or not
a child has exercised a degree of care commensurate with his age, capacity and
understanding. 6 Many advantages are cited in favor of the majority doctrine, among
which are its easy application, 7 the greater degree of protection afforded the child,
always a favorite of the law, against the prejudices and sympathies of juries. 8
Finally, it is asserted that the shifting standard which would result if juries were
allowed to settle the problem is averted by the application of this rule.9 In defense
of the Massachusetts rule it is said that the infant may become a pawn for un-
scrupulous persons and therefore should be protected by the law. However, it would
seem that the law need not fear a jury's discrimination against an infant. Common
experience has shown that the prejudices of men do not incline against the infant
but rather favor and seek to protect him.10 Further, the advocates of the Massa-
chusetts rule, although conceding the facility with which the Illinois rule may be
gence," Ruel v. Lidgerwood, 23 N. D. 6, 18, 135 N. W. 793, 796 (1912); "Practically no
cases are found which hold that a child of six years of age can be charged with negligence,"
Palermo v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 130 La. 833, 836, 58 So. 589, 590 (1912); "It is almost
universally held that a child under five years cannot be guilty of contributory negligence
in any event," Eskildsen v. City of Seattle, 29 Wash. 583, 585, 70 Pac. 64, 65 (1902).
Both those in favor of the majority rule and those recommending the one suggested by
the minority claim that statements such as these are in accord with their particular theoy.
Wilderman, supra note 2, at 431, argues that the result of these decisions is to establish
an arbitrary rule in those jurisdictions. But cf. (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. REV. 78, 82. For
cases establishing other ages at which the presumption is applicable, see Note L. R. A.
1917F 54-72.
5. At common law an infant under the age of seven could not commit a felony. There
was a presumption of his inability so to do until he reached the age of fourteen. See
Baker v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 150 N. C. 562, 565, 64 S. E. 506, 508 (1909); (1919) 32
HAuv. L. Rav. 434.
6. See Cama'ada v. New York State Rys., 247 N. Y. 111, 117, 159 N. E. 879, 881
(1928), in which Judge Lehman says: "Recovery may be had for the injuries inflicted
upon a child by the negligence of another only where an inference may be drawn from
the evidence presented in the particular case that no failure on the patt of the child to
exercise the care which might reasonably be expected of a child of equal age and capacity
contributed to the injury." The court may decide the case as matter of law only where
the circumstances admit of but one inference. Kyle v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 260,
102 N. E. 310 (1913); Schmidt v. Reiss, 186 Wis. 587, 203 N. W. 362 (1925). The court
must give the jury very careful instructions. See McMahon v. Northern Central Ry. Co.,
39 Md. 438, 449 (1873). For cases which employ as a test for capacity, discretion and
understanding, appreciation of good and evil, right and wrong, see Rhodes v. Georgia
R. & Bkg. Co., 84 Ga. 320, 324, 10 S. E. 922, 923 (1890); Hamilton v. Morgan's Co.,
42 La. Ann. 824, 831, 8 So. 586, 587 (1890).
7. In Maskaliunas v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 318 Ill.*142, 149, 149 N. E. 23, 26 (1925),
the court expresses its conviction that an imperfect rule is better than no rule at all.
8. See Nagle v. Allegheny Valley Ry. Co., 88 Pa. 25, 39 (1875).
9. Ibid.
10. See Obiter Dictum (1936) 5 FoRDHAm L. REv. 379; (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 79, 83.
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applied, cogently observe that one day's difference in age may be the dividing line
between capacity and incapacity, obviously an unfortunate test.x Nor is the argu-
ment of the shifting standard regarded as of great weight. It is urged that the
standard is not shifting, but rather, that the application varies in the particular
case with the individual child.'- The court in the instant case observed that under
present-day circumstances a child of six is permitted to assume many responsibilities.
There is much opportunity for him to observe and so to become aware of the
necessity for some degree of care. Hence the court finds no reason for the general
public to assume liability for the unwarranted carelessness of children, when such
carelessness in fact exists.' 3 Nor is the analogy to the criminal law sought to be
established by the Illinois rule regarded as correctly drawn, for it is said that the
capacity to commit crime involves the ability to understand the nature and illegality
of the particular act which constitutes the crime, a situation obviously distinguishable
from the capacity to care for one's personal safety.1 4 In the instant case Minnesota
has reverted to the Massachusetts rule, which some of its more recent decisions had
previously questioned.' 5
NEGLIGENCE-Res Ipsa Loquitur-FoREIGN SUBSTANCE IN BEVEAGE.-The plain-
tiff purchased a bottle of Coca-Cola from a merchant who had in turn purchased it
from the defendant manufacturer. A few days later, on drinking part of the con-
tents the plaintiff became aware of a foreign substance in her throat, coughed up
the remainder of the beverage and discovered that she had swallowed an insect.
A further examination disclosed a fungus growth in the bottle. As a result of this
experience the plaintiff became ill and brought an action for negligence. Held, one
judge dissenting, that the res ipsa loquitur rule was not applicable, and that the mere
fact of the injury and the presence of the foreign substance did not make out a case
of negligence. Blackwell v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 182 S. E. 469 (N. C. 1935).
With the decrease in direct sales between the original manufacturer of a foodstuff
and the ultimate consumer the question of determining the liability of the producer
to the consumer where a middleman or retailer intervenes becomes important. W"here
a plaintiff has been injured by a foreign substance imbedded in an article of food, he
may seek redress either from the immediate vendor' or from the original manu-
facturer.2 As against the former he may predicate his cause of action either ex
11. See U. S. L. Week, March 18, 1936, at 9.
12. See Camarada v. New York State Rys., 247 N. Y. 111, 118, 159 N. E. 879, 881
(1928); (1926) 74 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 78, 83.
13. See instant case at 778. See also, Hayes v. No~cross, 162 Afas. 546, 39 N. E. 282
(1895). It is sometimes suggested that no great harm is done to the defendant by the
application of the Illinois rule, inasmuch as the defendant was negligent anyway. This
contention is answered by the fact that though one person is at fault this will not dispense
with the other's using reasonable care. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng.
Repfints 926 (K. B. 1809); see Ritscher v. Orange & P. V. Ry. Co., 79 N. J. L. 462, 464,
75 At. 209, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (as matter of public policy); Walters v. The C. R. L &
P. R. Co., 41 Iowa 71, 75 (1875).
14. See Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 132, 139, 106 At. 682, 685 (1919).
15. Decker v. Atasca Paper Co., 39 ]&finn. 439, 127 N. W. 183 (1910); Converse v.
Aldeman, 153 Minn. 306, 190 N. W. 340 (1922).
1. Cases cited in notes 3 and 4, infra.
2. Cases cited in notes 7, 8, 14-22.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
contractu for breach of an implied warranty 3 or ex delicto in negligence. 4 Three
disadvantages are encountered in suing the immediate vendor: the retailer will sue
his vendor, who will in turn sue his vendor, thus leading to a multiplicity of suits;6
the retailer, who is probably innocent, will have two lawsuits on his hands; and
where the immediate vendor is a small retailer there will be little likelihood of satis-
fying a large judgment.6 On the other hand, if the consumer attempts to collect
damages from the original manufacturer the jurisdictions are in conflict as to
whether he may' sue for breach of warranty.7 The courts supporting this cause of
action assert that there is an implied warranty running with the product to the
public in general.8 The opposing courts contend that since there is no contractual
privity existing between the consumer and the manufacturer there can be no war-
ranty.9  In these jurisdictions the injured party may predicate his cause of action
ex delicto in negligence since the manufacturer of a foodstuff, like the manufacturer
of an inherently dangerous object,10 owes a duty to the consumer to see that the food
is fit for consumption." If the plaintiff in these suits is obliged to go forward and
prove, his case as in the ordinary negligence action, his chances for recovery will be
very remote. As a result many courts have resorted to an application of the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur or its equivalent to relieve him of this disability.12 It is
generally asserted that the rule will apply where a plaintiff is injured and the in-
strumentality causing the injury is in the complete control and management of the
defendant or his servants, and the circumstances are such that no injury would ordi-
3. Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 49 P. (2d) 286 (Cal. App. 1935) (food eaten on premses
carries warranty); Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853 (1918); Gimenez v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27 (1934); S. H. Kress & Co. v.
Ferguson, 60 S. W. (2d) 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Contra: Gindraux v. Maurice Mer-
cantile Co., 36 P. (2d) 286 (Cal. App. 1934) (court reasoned since vendee knows as much
about sealed package as retailer there can be no warranty implied).
4. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Stell v, Town-
send California Glace Fruits, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 777, 28 P. (2d) 1077 (1934); Rlckner v.
Ritz Restaurant Co. of Passaic, 13 N. J. Misc. 818, 181 Atl. 398 (Super. Ct. 1935).
5. See Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 196 N. E. 634, 636 (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1935);
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 626, 135 Pac. 633, 636 (1913).
6. See Comment (1935) 4 FoRD Am L. Rxv. 295, 306.
7. See Comment (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1068.
8. Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pitts-
burgh, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 AtI. 537 (1931).
9. Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 57 F. (2d) 447 (App. D. C. 1932); Nehi Bottling Co.
v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. (2d) 701 (1932); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N. Y. 468,
139 N. E. 576 (1923); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935);
Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R. I. 43, 144 Aft. 884 (1929).
10. Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) (defective tractor
steering wheel); Farley v. Eduard E. Tower & Co., Inc., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N. E. 639
(1930) (pyroxoloid comb set afire by hot air from hair dryer); Thomas v. Winchester,
6 N. Y. *397 (1852) (deadly drug sold as harmless medicine); McPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) (defective wheel on automobile); Peters v.
Johnson, 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S. E. 190 (1932) (deadly drug sold as harmless medicine).
11. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920); Nehl
Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. (2d) 701 (1930); Tonsman v. Greenglass,
248 Mass. 275, 142 N. E. 756 (1924); see Comment (1918) 27 YALP L. J. 1068, 1071-1074.
12. Cases cited in notes 16-19, infra.
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narily result unless there were negligence on the part of the defendant.13 Thus where
the type of the container is such that the presence of a foreign substance can be
attributed solely to the negligence of the manufacturer, packer or bottler, the res
ipsa loquitur rule applies in favor of the injured consumer.14 As to the extent to which
this rule will aid the plaintiff, there is considerable disagreement. 1r The weight of
authority supports the "inference view,"' 0 that the mere proof of the presence of the
foreign substance and the resulting injury are sufficient to warrant the jury in in-
ferring negligence.' 7 The minority have accepted the more liberal "presumption
view," holding that a presumption arises which shifts the burden of going forward
upon the defendant,' 8 while other courts in what is known as the "risk of non-
persuasion view" have gone even further and hold that the very burden of proof
shifts.' 9  In some cases, although res ipsa loquitur is not mentioned20 or held in-
applicable,21 the inference view is in effect resorted to. Where the injured party
has not been accorded this advantage some courts have allowed the case to go to
the jury upon proof of similar and contemporaneous occurrences with respect to the
product of the defendant.22
Those jurisdictions which have adopted the inference view of the res ipsa loqzitur
rule employ it with extreme caution, on the ground that a more liberal construction
would work an undue hardship on the defendant. In answer to this contention, it is
to be observed that those courts which have allowed the injured party a cause of
action for breach of warranty even in the absence of privitym have gone even
further in aiding the plaintiff than the risk of non-persuasion view, since the absence
of negligence is no defense to an action for breach of warranty.
13. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dean, 43 Ga. App. 682, 160 S. E. 10S (1931);
see Comment (1935) 23 CA=. L. REv. 169, 169-170.
14. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S. W. (2d) 612 (1932)
(chewing tobacco comes within rule applied to food).
15. See (1924) 12 CAr. L. Rmv. 138, 139; Comment (1935) 23 id. 169, 170.
16. Eisenbeis v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P. (2d) 162 (1933); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Dean, 43 Ga. App. 682, 160 S. E. 105 (1932); Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co. v.
Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 At. 866 (1922); see (1924) 12 CAXu. L. Rnv. 138, 141-143.
17. Gainesville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Stewart, 179 S. E. 734 (Ga. App. 1933); see
(1924) 12 CuiF. L. REv. 138, 140.
18. Reichert Milling Co. v. George, 230 Ala. 13, 162 So. 393 (1934) ; see (1924) 12 C.,W.
L. RLv. 138.
19. Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684,33 S. W. (2d) 701 (1930).
20. Linker v. Quaker Oats Co., 11 F. Supp. 794 (D. N. D. 1935); Drury v. Armour,
140 Ark. 371, 216 S. W. 40 (1919) ; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W.
382 (1920); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mlich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924); DeGroat v.
Ward Baking Co., 102 N. J. L. 188, 130 AUt. 540 (1925); Campbell Soup Co. v. Davis,
163 Va. 89, 175 S. E. 743 (1934).
21. Tonsman v. Greenglass, 248 Mass. 275, 142 N. E. 756 (1924); Norfolk Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, Inc. v. Krausse, 162 Va. 107, 173 S. E. 497 (1934).
22. Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N. C. 175, 145 S. E. 14 (1928); Enloe
v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S. E. 582 (1935); Hampton v.
Thomasville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N. C. 331, 180 S. E. 584 (1935); see Merriman v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S. W. (2d) 149, 152 (1933) (inference may
be drawn from the presence of foreign substance and additional circumstantial evidence).
23. See cases cited note 8, supra.
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PRACTICE-LAw OF THE CASE-INTRLOCUTORY DECREES-ReS Adjudicata.-Tho
plaintiff commenced an action for separation. Upon a motion for alimony pendento
lite, which was opposed by the defendant, the court declined to decide the matter
summarily upon affidavits and ordered a reference "to take testimony and report
with all the convenient speed on the question whether a relationship of husband
and wife exists between the parties hereto, and upon the question of the financial
ability of the defendant." Decision on the motion was reserved pending, the report
of the referee. Seventeen witnesses were summoned and 567 pages of testimony were
taken. The referee reviewed all the facts and law in an exhaustive opinion and
reported that marital status between the parties did not exist. Thereafter, upon
application duly made, the referee's report was confirmed. No appeal was taken.
The defendant, in a supplemental answer, set up the determination above mentioned
as a defense on the ground that the order was a final adjudication between the parties
on the question of the nonexistence of a marital relationship. The plaintiff moved
to have this defense stricken out as insufficient in law, maintaining that an inter-
locutory decree is not a final order. The motion was denied. On appeal, held, one
justice dissenting, that a motion determined on its merits after a full hearing is
binding upon the parties and is res adjudicata as to the particular facts found.
Bannon v. Bannon, 245 App. Div. 521, 283 N. Y. Supp. 140 (lst Dep't 1935).*
If ever the much abused and all-inclusive phrase "public policy" has been oppor-
tunely employed to sustain a legal concept, its use has found no better justification
than in the sanction of the doctrine of res adjudicata.1 Investigation into the under-
lying bases for this rule reveals an ultimate consummation of the public policy.
Two objectives of major importance are gained by the recognition of this form of
judgment by estoppel: 2 first, that a limit should be prescribed to litigation for the
same cause of action;3 second, that in order to maintain the prestige and integrity
of the judicial process, a final determination once made should not be impeached. 4
Therefore, it is universally recognized that the rule of res adjudicata applies to any
litigation had before an appropriate tribunal from which there issues a conclusive
and final determination of the rights of the parties to the action.5 Apparently
finality and conclusiveness are prerequisite in order that a judgment or determination
be deemed res adjudicata, or more appropriately, judgment by estoppel.0 In New
York, under early decisions, it was held that an order on a motion, regardless of its
finality, had not the force of a former adjudication. 7 But by later cases, the rule
*Since this note was prepared, the Court of Appeals has unanimously 'reversed the hold-
ing of the Appellate Division. N. Y. L. J., April 15, 1936, at 1904.
1. See Fisch v. Vanderlip, 218 N. Y. 29, 36, 112 N. E. 425, 428 (1916); Comment (1932)
1 BROOxLYN L. REv. 73.
2. Fisch v. Vanderlip, 218 N. Y. 29, 112 N. E. 425 (1916); Silberstein v. Silberstein,
218 N. Y. 525, 113 N. E. 495 (1916). In St. John v. Fowler, 229 N. Y. 270, 128 N. E.
199 (1920), the court held that in oder that there be an estoppel, it is essential that the
order be binding on both parties.
3. See Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 555, 560 (1880).
4. See Williams v. Barkley, 165 N. Y. 48, 54, 58 N. E. 765, 766 (1900).
5. Demarest v. Darg, 32 N. Y. 281 (1865); Brown v. Mayor, 66 N. Y. 385 (1876);
Culross v. Gibbons, 130 N. Y. 447, 29 N. E. 839 (1892).
6. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184 (1872); Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 55 (1880);
cf. RuLEs Cv. PRAc. (1922) Rule 107 (5); see H. COHEN, TnE PowERs oF THr Nw vYORX
COURT OF APPEArLs (1934) 19. As to the problem of appealability, see Sunderland, The
Problem of Appellate Review (1929) 5 TEX. L. REv. 126.
7. Simson v. Hart, 14 Johns. *63 (N. Y. 1816); see Van Rensselaer v. The Sheriff,
1 Cow. 511, 512 (N. Y. 1823); Riggs v. Pursel, 74 N. Y. 370, 378 (1878).
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is now established that orders on motions affecting substantial rights, fully litigated
and from which an appeal lies, are conclusive of the matter adjudged and a bar to
further proceedings.8 In the instant case there was merely a linitcd right of appeal,
thus, the dissenting justice asserts, preventing the order from becoming rcs adjudicatao
It has been indicated, however, that a limited right of appeal should not prevent the
determination from operating as res adjudicata if there is a full hearing and the
order on motion is appealable or reviewable.10 An interlocutory decree is a non-final
judgment,11 incidentally determining certain of the issues, and looking forward to
8. White v. St. John, 25 N. Y. 203 (1862); Williams v. Barkley, 165 N. Y. 48, 58 N. E.
765 (1900); see Everett v. Everett, 180 N. Y. 452, 461, 73 N. E. 231, 233 (1905), wril of
error disndssed, 215 U. S. 203 (1909); Matter of Barkley, 42 App. Div. 597, 610, 59 N. Y.
Supp. 742, 751 (4th Dep't 1899). But cf. Riggs v. Pumell, 74 N. Y. 370, 375 (1878),
wherein the court regarded the application of res adjudicata to motions as limited.
The question of res adjudicata plays a prominent part in Thlings on pleadings. Where
the sufficiency of an answer was upheld on a motion to dismiss the answer, a subsequent
motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly denied, since the prior order was
binding as far as the subject matter was concerned. Endurance Holding Corp. v. Kramer
Surgical Stores Inc., 227 App. Div. 582, 238 N. Y. Supp. 377 (1st Dep't 1930). Cf.
Breuchaud v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 283 N. Y. Supp. 812, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Endurance Holding Corp. v. Kramer Surgical Stores, Inc., supra; Barber v. Rowe, 20
App. Div. 290, 193 N. Y. Supp. 157 (3d Dep't 1922), afId, 235 N. Y. 549, 139 N. E. 730
(1923); Fulton v. Hudson, 130 App. Div. 343, 114 N. Y. Supp. 642 (3d Dep't 1909),
aff'd, 200 N. Y. 287, 93 N. E. 1052 (1911); Lewis v. Cook, 150 N. Y. 163, 44, N. E. 778
(1896); Baxter v. McDonnell, 154 N. Y. 432, 48 N. E. 816 (1897); Note (1910) 26
L. R. A. (N. s.) 117; (1912) 60 U. or PA. L. REv. 458.
Compare also the doctrine that unless an exception is taken to a charge, the failure to
except operates as an estoppel even though the charge contains reversible error. Greenberg
v. Schlanger, 229 N. Y. 120, 127 N. E. 896 (1920); Sausbury v. Brown, 249 N. Y. 618,
164 N. E. 606 (1928), aff'g, 223 App. Div. 555, 229 N. Y. Supp. 70 (3d Dep't 1928). But
cf. Devoy v. Irish World, etc., 203 App. Div. 319, 203 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't 1924),
where the errors went "to the very foundation of the recovery."
Obviously, ex parte motions cannot be res adjudicata. Continental Securities Co. v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 118 Misc. 11, 193 N. Y. Supp. 892 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd,
200 App. Div. 794, 193 N. Y. Supp. 903 (1st Dep't 1922).
9. See Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 555, 560 (1880); Howell v. Mills, 53 N. Y. 322,
334 (1873). But cf. Maggi v. Sabatini, 250 N. Y. 296, 165 N. E. 454 (1929). See also,
H. Conym, op. cit. supra note 6, at 14 et seq.
10. See Dwight v. St. John, 25 N. Y. 203, 206 (1862). Note the broad language used
by the court in the leading case of Williams v. Barkley, 165 N. Y. 48, 54, 58 N. E. 765,
766 (1900): "A former adjudication is binding upon the parties and their privies and
prevents them from litigating over and over again such matters as were previously at
issue between them and were finally decided by a competent court. If the record of
the former proceeding, although made upon a motion, but after an investigation through
witnesses examined and cross-examined, shows that the decision could not have been made
without deciding the particular matter now in controversy, the latter must be regarded as
settled by the previous action of the court, for to litigate the matter anew would impeach
the first decision." (italics supplied.)
11. Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 555 (1880); Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N. Y. 114, 63 N. E.
823 (1902); cf. Albany Hospital v. Albany Guardian Soc., 214 N. Y. 435, 103 N. E. 812
(1915). Under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1921) § 580, an interlocutory decree is non-final and
reviewable on appeal of the final decision.
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a final decision of the court.12 Consequently, the appealability of such decrees as
of right is limited.' 3 The order on the motion for alimony pendente lite is deemed
an interlocutory decree, which does not decide the issues of the case but is merely
tentative and provisional.14 Further, it is said that facts found at the trial may
be entirely inconsistent with those found by the referee or judge in granting
temporary alimony.', Technically this is true, and it is the stand taken by the
dissenting justice in upholding the plaintiff's contention. The minority court's ruling
is a justifiable interpretation, lacking neither merit nor legal authority.' 0  More
commendable is the prevailing view which honors substance above form and charts
a new course for expeditious litigation. The majority court intentionally charac-
terized this determination as an order on a motion rather than an interlocutory decree,
and thereby refused to recognize a distinction between motions in equity and motions
at law. It was the intention of the Code revisers to make the adjective branches
of law and equity uniform and identical. 17 For unknown reasons, judicial inter-
pretation clung to the distinction between legal and equitable actions,' 8 and all the
incidental practice relating thereto. There is no valid reason for this distinction
under New York practice. It is submitted that a determination of any proceeding,
whether in law or equity, reached after an exhaustive hearing with ample opportunity
for examination and cross-examination, should be deemed res adjudicata.1' Ample
opportunity, under the New York practice, is afforded for a rehearing as to the propriety
of the decision either by way of appeal, or by way of review.20 Economy in the
administration of justice and the best interests of the community dictate that once
the truth comes to the fore it be binding on the parties.
STATUTE OF WILLs--PosTHUMOUS PERFORMANCE OF COXTRACTrs.-The plaintiff sued
the defendant, executor under the last will and testament of A, upon the following
instrument: "In consideration of my interest in Christian Education and for and
12. Percy v. Huyck, 252 N. Y. 168, 169 N. E. 127 (1929); see Cambridge Valley Nat.
Bank v. Lynch, 76 N. Y. 514, 516 (1879); N. Y. Civ. PvAc. AcT (1921) § 447; H. CoHN,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 33-34.
13. Anderson v. Daley, 159 N. Y. 146, 53 N. E. 753 (1899); Whaley v. Perkins, 231
App. Div. 502, 248 N. Y. Supp. 64 (1st Dep't 1931). But cf. Smith v. Zalinski, 94 N. Y.
519 (1884).
14. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184 (1872); see H. ConEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 67.
15. New York & N. J. Tel. Co. v. Metropolitan Tel. Co., 81 Hun 453 (N. Y. 1894);
see Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184, 202 (1872).
16. Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 555 (1880); New York & N. J. Tel. Co. v. Metro-
politan Tel. Co., 81 Hun 453 (N. Y. 1894); Metropolitan El. Ry. Co. v. Manhattan Ry.
Co., 14 Abb. N. C. 103 (N. Y. 1884); ef. Culross v. Gibbons, 130 N. Y. 447, 29 N. E.
839 (1892).
17. See Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 555, 560 (1880); H. ConEN, op. cit. supra note 6
at 24 et seq. The instant case has been cited with approval in Breuchaud v. Bank of
N. Y. & Trust Co., 283 N. Y. Supp. 812, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
18. See H. CoHzN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 24, n. 38.
19. Culross v. Gibbons, 130 N. Y. 447, 29 N. E. 839 (1892); see Dwight v. St. John,
25 N. Y. 203, 206 (1862); Demarest v. Darg, 32 N. Y. 281, 290 (1865); Leavitt v. Wolcott,
95 N. Y. 212, 219 (1884). In comparing the language of the courts in the foregoing
cases, it seems that regardless of the "vehicle" that resulted in a final determination of facts
on its merits, if there was an open and full hearing the determination should be res
adjudicata. See H. COHEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 25.
20. Brown v. Mayor, 66 N. Y. 385 (1876); Victory v. Blood, 93 N. Y. 650 (1883);
see Comment (1932) 1 BRoox,.N L. Rav. 73, 79; N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr (1921) § 580.
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in consideration of mutual promises of other subscribers to the American University
Fund. . . I hereby promise and will pay to the American University ... the sum
of $5,000.
"This subscription is made on the following terms and conditions: 1. This pledge
shall become due upon the day of my decease and shall be paid within one year
thereafter by my administrator or executor out of the proceeds of my estate. To
be known as the A Memorial Scholarship Fund." The instrument was signed and
witnessed, but not so as to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Wills of New
Jersey. From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals. Held, four justices
dissenting, that although supported by sufficient consideration, nevertheless the in-
strument contemplated a testamentary disposition of property, and was void for
failure to comply with the formalities of the Statute of Wills. Judgment affirmed.'
American University v. Conover, 180 At. 830 (N. J. Ct. Err. and App. 1935).
Once the source of prolific controversy in the law, but now firmly embedded
therein, the doctrine of charitable subscriptions2 is sustained on one of several
familiar theories. 3 In accordance with the prevailing view, numerous courts maintain
that consideration for a subscription to a fund for a charitable, religious or educa-
tional institution may be unearthed from the expenditure of time, labor or money
in the securing of additional subscriptions. 4 In other jurisdictions the validity and
enforceability of subscription agreements are sustained on the theory that the mutual
promises of persons contributing to a fund for the accomplishment of a common
object, which can be accomplished only through their aggregate efforts, constitute
reciprocal obligations and are each a sufficient consideration to support the validity
of the others.5 Further, the duty assumed by the promisee to perpetuate the name
of the founder of the memorial is sufficient consideration in itself to give validity
to the subscription contract.6 It is obvious that the application of either theory
1. This note is not concerned with the third question raised in the case, namely, whether
or not there was a valid gift. As to the requisites essential for an enforceable gift see
Note (1919) 3 A. L. R. 902.
2. As to the consideration requisite to support business subscriptions, see Martin v. Mele,
179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397 (1901); Richmondville Union Seminary v. McDonald,
34 N. Y. 379 (1866).
3. See notes 4 and 5 infra.
4. Trustees of Kentucky Baptist Education Soc. v. Carter, 72 Ill. 247 (1874); Brohaw
v. McElroy, 162 Iowa 288, 143 N. W. 1087 (1913); Presbyterian Soc. v. Beach, 74 N. Y.
72 (1878); Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901); Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927)
(culminating the doctrine of charitable subscriptions in New York); Converse's Estate,
240 Pa. 458, 87 Aft. 849 (1913); De Pauw University v. Ankeny, 97 Wash. 451, 166 Pac.
1148 (1917); Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 868; (1922) 8 Coru.. L. Q. 57; (1920) 34 HM.
L. REv. 220; 1 WILunsro, Co. rcTs (1920) § 116.
5. Capelle v. Trinity M. E. Church, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,392 (D. Del. 1875); Christian
College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347 (1894); Trustees of Berkeley Divinity School v. Jarvis,
32 Conn. 412 (1865); Clark Memorial Masonic Ass'n v. Colman, 222 Mich. 599, 193 N. W.
219 (1923); Edinboro Academy v. Robinson, 37 Pa. 210 (1860). For a dLscussion of
the authorities see Billig, Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12
Com. L. Q. 467.
6. New Jersey Orthopaedic Hospital & Dispensary v. Wright, 95 N. J. L. 462, 113
At. 144 (1921); Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jameston,
246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927). For a valuable review of the authorities, see the
opinion of Surrogate Slater in First Methodist Episcopal Church v. Howard, 133 Misc.
723, 233 N. Y. Supp. 451 (Surr. Ct. 1929), affd without opinion, 233 App. Div. 7S3, 250
N. Y. Supp. 906 (2d Dep't 1931).
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to the subscription agreement at bar, results in the establishment of an enforceable
contract. Consideration may be found in the mutual promises of the several sub-
scribers or in the establishment or naming of the desired scholarship fund. The
majority of the instant court concedes that there existed a valid subscription
agreement.
However, the mere fact that the performance of a valid and subsisting contract
is postponed until after the death of the promisor, will not relegate that contract
to the category of a testamentary disposition of property.7 The Statute of Wills
does not encompass every case where an owner stipulates by contract for the disposi-
tion of his property at the time of his death.8 Repeatedly, tribunals of justice
have enunciated the principle that if the instrument created a debitum in praesentis,
an obligation existing in the lifetime of the promisor, the fact that it was not to
be discharged until after the obligor's death, renders it none the less enforceable
as a claim against his estate. An instrument, otherwise valid, in the form of a
note, bond, or other agreement for the payment of money is not rendered invalid
as such, merely because payment is postponed until or after death.9 Such evidences
of indebtedness are not testamentary in character and need not be executed in
accordance with the formalities required in the execution of wills.10
Moreover, a will is a unilateral instrument by which a person makes a disposition
of his property, to take effect after his decease, and which during the lifetime of
the testator vests no rights in the legatees or devisees, but is in nature ambulatory
and revocable during his lifetime. It is this ambulatory quality which forms the
predominant characteristic of wills. A disposition by deed or contract may postpone
possession or enjoyment until the death of the disposing or contracting party, yet
the postponement is in such case produced by the express terms of the instrument
and does not result from the nature of the agreement. 1 ' While a will may be
7. See note 8 infra.
8. Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858); Holyoke Nat. Bank v. Bailey, 267
Mass. 296, 174 N. E. 230 (1931); 1 JARmAN, WiLLs (6th ed. 1893) 27.
9. Crider v. Shelby, 95 Fed. 212 (C. C. Ind. 1899); First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis,
178 Iowa 1352, 161 N. W. 183 (1917); Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28 N. E. 578
(1891); Hegeman v. Moon, 131 N. Y. 462, 30 N. E. 487 (1892); Eisenlobr's Estate, 258
Pa. 438, 102 Atl. 117 (1917) ; 3 K=~r. Commr. (14th ed. 1896) *110.
10. Huguley v. Lanier, 86 Ga. 636, 12 S. E. 922 (1891) (ante-nuptial agreement to pay
D's intended wife $4000 upon D's death); First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis, 178 Iowa
1352, 161 N. W. 183 (1917) (contract for the payment of money after promisor's death);
In re Estate of Griswold, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N. W. 609 (1925) (charitable subscription
"due and payable at my death"); Jensen v. Jensen's Estate, 253 N. W. 619 (S. D. 1934);
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 369,
159 N. E. 173 (1927) (charitable subscription "due thirty days after my death") semble.
The tendency of the New Jersey courts is to hold that such instruments are a testamentaty
disposition of property and therefore require for their validity execution in accoldance
with the formalities of the Statute of Wills. Reed v. Bonner, 91 N. J. L. 712, 102 Atl.
383 (1917); United States Trust Co. v. Giveans, 97 N. J. L. 265, 117 Atl. 46 (1921);
Trenton Say. Fund Soc. v. Wythman, 106 N. J. Eq. 93, 148 Atl. 622 (1930).
11. Isle" v. Griffin, 134 Ga. 192, 67 S. E. 854 "(1910); Bromley v. Mitchell, 155 Mass.
509, 30 N. E. 83 (1892) ; In re Bennett's Will, 180 N. C. 5, 103 S. E. 917 (1920) ; Delfendorf
v. Deifendorf, 132 N. Y. 100, 30 N. E. 375 (1892); Robb v. Washington & Jefferson
College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (1906); Matter of Brunswick, 143 Misc. 573, 256
N. Y. Supp. 879 (Surr. Ct. 1932) ; In re Niel's Estate, 111 Ore. 282, 226 Pac. 439 (1924) ;
Youngs v. O'Donnell, 129 Wash. 219, 224 Pac. 682 (1924); 1 PAoE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926)
§ 50; 1 ScHOUa R, W=.s AND ExECUTORs (1915) § 10.
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revoked solely at the pleasure of the testator, this is not true of a contract which
creates a debitum in praesenti, the breach of which occasions an action for damages
against the party at fault. The majority view in the instant case is not only opposed
to the weight of American authority, but seems wrong in principle. Furthermore
it frustrates the plainly expressed benevolent purpose of A to assist the American
University in return for its establishment of the A Memorial Scholarship Fund.
